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IS CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPT?
HARVEY R. MILLER *
SHAI Y. WAISMAN **
Abstract: This Article discusses the continuing contraction of business
reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code. It argues that it is wrong to
assume that there is no need for a business reorganization law in a
modern, service-oriented economy that has well-developed capital
markets. The Article first analyzes and contrasts bankruptcy law in the
United States under the Chandler Act of 1938, which fostered the
concept of reorganization and rehabilitation of distressed business
entities, and under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which built
upon lessons learned under the Chandler Act and pursuant to which
bankruptcy reorganization became an appropriate and necessary ve-
hicle to preserve and protect the values of major business organizations.
The Article then traces the economic, legal, political, and ideological
changes that threaten the viability of corporate rehabilitation, including
the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 2005. Finally, this Article responds directly to anti-Chapter
11 theorists, arguing: (1) reorganization remains relevant to preserving
going-concern values in today's economy, (2) Chapter 11 has significant
value as a transparent, neutral, multi-party forum to address the
insolvency of a business, even when a marketplace exists for the debtor's
assets, and (3) the privatization of the insolvency process is both
unworkable and undesirable.
INTRODUCTION
The concept of debtor reorganization and rehabilitation is in
peril. The marvel of modern reorganizations of financially distressed
businesses that was ignited by the railroad equity receiverships of the
nineteenth century and codified by twentieth-century legislation is
fading. As the twenty-first century progresses, the use of Chapter 11 of
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the Bankruptcy Code' as a primary reorganization and rehabilitation
tool for businesses is under relentless attack—an attack led by those
who want to revert back to strict enforcement of contracts and the
primacy of creditor rights. Fundamental changes in the economy, ac-
companied by a shifting and more conservative intellectual approach,
are now leading to cries that Chapter 11 is obsolete and irrelevant in a
modern economy.
The concept of an even-handed process to deal with financial
distress, insolvency, and the interests of all involved parties, although
only almost a century old in its modern form in the United States, has
a history that goes back to biblical times. It has been subject to con-
stant revision to reflect shifting societal goals, the consequences of
failure, and the perception of the debtor as a real party in interest.
Thus, the innovative use of equity receiverships to reorganize rail-
roads that created the paradigm for modern reorganization principles
occurred during the Industrial Revolution, a period when rapid in-
dustrialization caused significant social and economic upheaval as the
United States transformed from an agrarian to a manufacturing and
industrial economy. The preservation of going-concern values and
jobs became more important than the enforcement of contractual
rights and the liquidation and dismemberment of a debtor's assets to
benefit particular creditors.
Today, Chapter 11 critics can point to recent statistics to bolster
their argument that Chapter 11 has outlived its usefulness. During the
ten-year period from 1994 to 2003, the total number of bankruptcy
cases filed increased by an average of 8.53% per year. 2 Yet, during the
same period, the number of Chapter 11 cases filed decreased by an av-
erage of 4.13% per year. 3 From a different perspective, in 1994, 1.77%
of total bankruptcy cases filed were Chapter 11 cases. 4 In 2003, the per-
centage dropped to 0.57%. 3 These statistics raise the question whether
there is a growing recognition that Chapter 11 is losing its attraction as
1 The current law of bankruptcy is found in Title 11 of the United States Code. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2000). Its foundation is the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (effective Oct. 1, 1979) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101
et seq. (2000)). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is typically referred to as the "Bank-
ruptcy Code" or the "Code." References in this work to the "Bankruptcy Code" or the
"Code" are to Title 11 of the United States Code.
2 2004 BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK & ALMANAC 5 (Christopher M. McHugh & Thomas A.
Sawyer eds., 2004) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Yearbook].
3 Id.
4 Id.
6 Id.
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a process to rehabilitate and resuscitate a distressed business entity.6
The qualitative statistics are also revealing. Professor Lynn M. LoPucki
has reported that, between 1982 and 1990, over 80% of Chapter 11
cases resulted in reorganizations.? A downward trend began in 1996,
when this statistic fell to 63%, and, for 2000 and 2002, to 51%. 8 Profes-
sors Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen have concluded: "Cor-
porate reorganizations have all but disappeared. Giant corporations
make headlines when they file for Chapter 11, but they are no longer
using it to rescue a firm from imminent failure. Many use Chapter 11
merely to sell their assets and divide up the proceeds." 6
Has the structure of our economy changed so fundamentally that
the concept of bankruptcy reorganization as we know it has ceased to
be relevant? If not, what explains these statistics? To address these
questions properly, one must review the history and development of
bankruptcy law and reorganization in America and the modern de-
velopments in the Chapter 11 arena. Part I of this Article traces the
historical roots of bankruptcy law in America since the Great Depres-
sion—the catalyst for the Chandler Act, which represented the first
lasting codification of national bankruptcy reorganization law in-
tended to deal with the failure of large businesses.° Part II analyzes
the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, emphasizing the
legislative goal of encouraging debtor rehabilitation." Part III assesses
today's changing economy and other modern developments affecting
business reorganizations. 12 Part IV analyzes the implications of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005. 13 Finally, Part V of this Article addresses the points raised by the
anti-Chapter 11 theorists and highlights the current issues affecting
the viability of bankruptcy reorganization today. 14
8 See id.
7
 Francoise C. Arsenault, Going, Going Gone—Upward Trend in Section 363 Saks, TURN-
AROUNDS & Wolutotrts, Dec. 15,2004, at 4.
8 Id.
9 Douglas G. Baird Sc Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Si.AN L. Ray.
751,751 (2002).
la See infra notes 15-78 and accompanying text.
Set infra notes 79-139 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 140-90 and accompanying text.
la See infra notes 191-227 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 228-87 and accompanying text.
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I. THE STATE OF BANKRUPTCY LAW BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY
REFORM ACT OF 1978
Credit is an integral part of the economic security and well-being
of our society. 15 Insolvency laws that provide a level of certainty with
respect to the treatment of debtors and creditors when dealing with
inevitable failures or defaults of businesses are critical to instilling
confidence and encouraging the extension and use of credit in our so-
ciety
The need for such laws was recognized early in the nation's his-
tory. Thus, it was contemplated that the protection of debtors' rights
and the exercise of creditors' rights would be established through the
enactment of a uniform national bankruptcy law. Article I, section 8,
clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution provides Congress with the power to
"establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout
the United States." 18 James Madison pronounced, "[t]he power of es-
tablishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with
the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the
parties or their , property may lie or be removed into different States,
that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question." 17
Notwithstanding the constitutional authority to enact national
bankruptcy laws, the road to lasting federal bankruptcy legislation was a
bumpy, intermittent one. Congress rarely reached consensus through-
out the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as to bankruptcy legis-
lation. Southern agricultural states, suspicious of northern Federalist
ideals, were opposed to a national bankruptcy law that would govern
the appropriation of real and personal property by operation of law to
satisfy creditor claims. 18 In contrast, Northerners favoring a strong cen-
tral government supported bankruptcy legislation as necessary to pro-
mote commercial enterprise, to encourage the extension of credit, and
to protect creditors and personal liberties. 18
15 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2622 Before the H.
Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 9, 12 (2003) (testimony of John W. Snow, Treasury
Secretary), available at http://financialservices.house.gor/media/pdf/108-47.pdf .
1 ° U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
17 THE FEDERALIST No.42, at 271 ( James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
la See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY or BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA 26 (2001).
19 See RON CIIERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 308, 326 (2004); SKEEL, supra note 18, at
26; James A. McLaughlin, Book Review, 49 HARV. L. REV. 861, 862, 864 (1936) (reviewing
CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STAVES HISTORY (1935)).
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Consequently, the evolution of bankruptcy law has been the prod-
uct of distrust of federal courts and the economic "bust-and-boom" cy-
cle." Periods of economic downturn resulted in calls for bankruptcy
legislation and relief, while periods of recovery resulted in the repeal of
such legislation prior to the twentieth century. 21
 The Great Depression
of the 1930s was the catalyst for the passage of the Chandler Act of 1938
(the "Chandler Act"), which amended the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and
provided for a lasting codification of the bankruptcy reorganization
principles that had evolved during the equity receivership reorganiza-
tions of railroads.22
A. Passage of the Chandler Ad of 1938
During the "Roaring Twenties," there was a widespread belief that
a booming economy and heightened living standards would continue
to increase indefinitely. When the world monetary system collapsed
and a general panic among bankers and businesses ensued with the
onslaught of the Great Depression, the viability of the economy came
into question. Popular mistrust and hostility toward the business barons
of Wall Street grew exponentially. These pressures first provided the
catalyst for the reform and government intervention that ultimately
resulted in the New Deal and then shaped the resulting legislation to
deal with the economic depression.
On October 29, 1929, the stock market crashed, resulting in the
loss of $10 billion to $15 billion of market value in one day. Declining
prices and falling production ensued, and unemployment increased at
a drastic rate. The United States and other nations fell deeper and
deeper into the Great Depression, widely considered to be the worst
and longest economic collapse in the history of the modern industrial
world. Workers were unemployed because companies would not hire
them, and companies would not hire employees because there was no
market for goods as workers did not have income to purchase goods. In
1933, at the nadir of the Great Depression, over fifteen million Ameri-
" UEFA., supra note 18, at 24-25 (noting that this traditional account, while inaccurate
in some respects, is a convenient framework for describing the first century of bankruptcy
debate).
21 Id.
22
 Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y Waistnan, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable
Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Centuty?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 166-67
(2004) (citations omitted). For a detailed discussion of the history of bankruptcy law prior
to the passage of the Chandler Act and the historical treatment of the "hapless debtor, - see
id. at 153-66.
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cans—one quarter of the nation's workforce—were unemployed, and
shares of equity interests maintained only 20% of their pre-crash
value. 23
Just as economic panics before have spawned national legislation,
the Great Depression caused the nation to consider remedial bank-
ruptcy legislation. The survival of distressed businesses and their re-
lated employment opportunities became a major objective of Congress.
Initially, during the early 1930s, emergency legislation was enacted to
provide an alternative to liquidation of distressed business entities un-
der the protection of the district courts sitting as bankruptcy courts (for
example, sections 77 and 77b of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898).24 The
emergency legislation, intended to enable the reorganization of busi-
ness entities, was followed by the realization that a more comprehensive
statutory scheme was necessary to meet the economic crisis of the
Great Depression. 25
Guidance came from the experiences of the railroad equity re-
ceiverships. The railroad equity receivership was a business structure
fashioned to meet the crisis resulting from the widespread failure of
the railroad industry after the Civil War. 26 As David Skeel has noted,
etween 1873 and the end of the nineteenth century, roughly one-
third of all the railroads—some seven hundred in all—failed, and in
some years nearly 20% of the nation's track was in receivership." 27
Railroads, the construction of which were heavily subsidized by the
federal government, were seen as a central part of a new national
economy because of their ability to move goods and people over long
distances within a short period of time. By their nature, the assets of a
railroad crossed multiple state lines. Consequently, in the event of de-
fault, the railroad faced the threat of individual creditors obtaining
state court judgments and causing the dismemberment of the rail-
road's assets to satisfy such judgments. Many of the fledgling railroads
were net consumers of cash and undercapitalized. Similar to the con-
temporary failures involving telecom companies, the railroad pro-
moters underestimated the cost of construction, geographical obsta-
23 See generally J. Bradford DeLong, The Economic History of the Twentieth Century:
Slouching Towards Utopia? (Mar. 1, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley and National Bureau of Economic Research), available at http://www.j-
hradford-delong.net/TCEH/Siouch_title.html.
24 SCE SXEEL, supra note 18, at 73-79.
25
	
id. at 74.
26 Id. at 48-70.
r Id. at 51-52.
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cies, and the time of construction and completion, and overestimated
the projected volume of passenger and freight traffic. The result was
liquidity deficiencies and defaults in their respective obligations.
In response to the threat that the railroads would cease opera-
tions, and drawing upon their equitable authority to appoint receivers
to administer properties when appropriate, progressive federal district
courts forged the concept of using equity receiverships to assume con-
trol of a defaulting railroad and its assets. 28
 The federal railroad equity
receivership negated state borders and provided a single forum to
protect and administer the assets of the distressed railroad. The proc-
ess involved the debtor railroad, the significant creditors, and the fed-
eral district court working together to effectuate the continuation of
the railroad in the public interest. 29 At the same time, the affected
parties in interest, through the use of protective committees and re-
ceivers appointed by the federal court, negotiated the reorganization •
and recapitalization of the railroad."
The process generally began with the filing of a "creditor's bill,"
which formally asked the court to appoint a receiver, a judicially ap-
pointed person entrusted with receiving and preserving property sub-
ject to a judicial proceeding. 91 The filing of a creditor's bill acted as a
modern-day "automatic stay."82 The process followed with the technical
filing of a "foreclosure bill," which asked the court to schedule a sale of
the property." The debtor railroad did not contest the bills and usually
consented to the relief requested." Multiple protective committees of
bondholders and stockholders would be formed to represent respective
stakeholders in the bargaining process, and negotiations to restructure
the railroad's financial affairs would ensue." The negotiations would
culminate in a reorganization plan that would recapitalize the railroad
as a new entity and distribute new securities to the stockholders pursu-
ant to the plan."
Two central modern bankruptcy concepts emerged from the rail-.
road receivership paradigm: (1) the notion of preserving going-
concern value for economic stakeholders by allowing the debtor's op-
28 See id. at 57.
" SKEEL, supra note 18, at 57.
' Id. at 57-59.
81 Id. at 58.
52 Id.
83 Id.
34 Sum, supra note 18, at 58.
33 Id. at 58-59.
9a
	 at 57-59.
136	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 47:129
erations to continue as an ongoing business, and (2) the retention and
active participation of the railroad's management in the operations of
the railroad and the development of a business plan to support a reor-
ganization. Prior to the railroad failures, receiverships were tradition-
ally viewed as an extreme remedy that contemplated "the absolute
wresting away from the hands of its owners of property of such peculiar
character, and often of such enormous value." 37 Instead of adopting
this traditional view, federal courts in the railroad receivership era re-
acted to the necessity of preserving value and serving the public inter-
est and crafted novel ideas that served as the paradigm for modern re-
organizations.38 Creditors and courts embraced the concept that the
debtor's (i.e., existing management's) knowledge, expertise, and fa-
miliarity with its business were inherently valuable in large, complex,
corporate restructurings." The participation of the debtor in the rail-
road equity receiverships became nearly indispensable.°
This debtor-hi-possession concept was memorialized in 1884 with
Wabash, St. Louis, and Pacific Railway ("Wabash"), which was one of
the first voluntary equity receiverships and one of the most cele-
brated."' Until Wabash, receivership had been purely a creditors'
remedy, initiated only after a creditor's request and a foreclosure ac-
tion against collateral security by one or more classes of creditors. 42 In
the case of Wabash, representatives of the railroad (Wall Street inves-
tors) themselves sought and obtained judicial authority to commence a
receivership and to be appointed as the receivers, in an effort to con-
tinue to operate and manage the railroad prior to the railroad default-
ing in the payment of interest. 43 As Skeel observed, "Wabash was ...
the most vivid illustration of the fact that managers and their Wall
Street professionals, not ordinary creditors, were the ones who con-
trolled the reorganization process."44
The railroad receivership courts afforded railroad managers, in-
vestment bankers, and reorganization lawyers substantial leeway in
37 D.H. Chamberlain, New-Fashioned Receiverships, 10 HARV. L. REV. 139, 141 (1896).
30 SEEM., supra note 18, at 57.
" Sce Harvey R. Miller & Erica M. Ryland, The Role of Mega Cases in the Development of
Bankruptcy Law, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION LAW IN THE
COURTS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT OFTHE UNITED STATES 189, 210 (1995).
4° See Chamberlain, supra note 37, at 140.
41 Albro Martin, Railroads and the Equity Receivership: An Essay on Institutional Change, 39
J. ECON. HIST. 685, 697-701 (1974).
42 SKEEL, supra note 18, at 64.
43 Id.
44 Id.
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their prosecution of the cases. Managers would oversee the business
operations, while the bankers and attorneys would negotiate the reor-
ganization with the creditor constituencies through the device of pro-
tective committees. Cognizant of the expanding power the investment
bankers and lawyers exercised as they became more efficient at the
receivership process, courts alluded to the ideological consensus in
favor of reorganizing troubled railroads—that railroads served the
public interest and should not be allowed to fail—and hinted that
such leniency would not be afforded to the reorganization of other
types of entities.45
The equity receivership process, however, was not without its de-
tractors. Critics complained that bankers would routinely allocate them-
selves generous underwriting fees upon the issuance of new securities as
part of the reorganization plan, and attorneys and other professionals
would receive very substantial fees with minimal oversight before any-
one else in the case was paid. 46
 Moreover, critics contended that attor-
neys were often compromised by their relationship with managers and
looked the other way in the presence of fraud or mismanagement- 47
As the Great Depression continued, Congress considered legisla-
tive action to preserve the nation's industrial and commercial base. The
newly formed Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") com-
missioned a study to review the use of federal consent receiverships to
reorganize distressed business and to develop a legislative proposal in
connection therewith." The result was the enactment of the Chandler
Act. 49
 It codified the principles developed in railroad reorganization
cases as the basis for rehabilitating and reorganizing distressed busi-
nesses." It provided for a single, nationwide forum to deal with busi-
ness failures and the interests of the economic stakeholders." The
Chandler Act encompassed the proposals of the SEC based upon its
study of federal consent receivership cases and the use of protective
committees by enacting Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, entitled
"Corporate Reorganizations." 52 Chapter X was intended to provide the
45
 See Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U.S. 348, 356 (1932); Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U.S. 36, 52
(1928); SKEEL, supra note 18, at 105.
411 See SKEEL, supra note 18, at 110-11.
47 See id.
48 Miller & Ryland, supra note 39, at 211.
49 See generally Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938), repealed by Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
5° See id.; Miller & Ryland, supra note 39, at 213-14.
51 See Act ofJune 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. at 840.
22 Id. at 883; Miller & Ryland, supra note 39, at 213-14.
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vehicle for the reorganization of large, publicly owned corporations,
and to avoid the evils that had been associated with the Wall Street-
controlled equity receiverships and that had been uncovered by the
SEC study.55
 hi addition, the Chandler Act included the enactment of
Chapter XI—"Arrangements"—of the Bankruptcy Act. 54 Chapter XI,
intended to deal only with unsecured credit of smaller debtors, en-
dorsed the concept of a debtor-in-possession, in lieu of a receiver or a
trustee, to administer the debtor's estate during the Chapter XI proc-
ess.55 The Chandler Act drew on both the populist mistrust of the Wall
Street community and attorneys who controlled many of the receiver-
ship cases of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the populist
sentiment associated with the New Deal reform legislation endorsed by
substantial Democratic majorities in the House of Representatives and
the Senate. 56
B. Chapter X
Chapter X provided the statutory framework for a comprehen-
sive reorganization of a financially distressed corporation. It was in-
tended to deal with all aspects of the corporation's business and capi-
tal structure. Under Chapter X, relief was available both on a
voluntary and involuntary basis. Because Chapter X was intended to
deal with large publicly owned corporations, it provided that the ad-
ministration of a Chapter X case, in large measure, would be under
the direct supervision of a U.S. district court judge rather than a refe-
ree in bankruptcy. 57 It provided for (a) the mandatory appointment
of one or more trustees in reorganization, if the liabilities of the cor-
poration exceeded $250,000; (b) the appointment of an "examiner" if
no trustee was mandated; (c) the strict application of the fair and eq-
uitable (absolute priority) rule that required an elaborate process to
determine the enterprise value of the debtor's business; (d) the ability
to impair the rights of secured and unsecured creditors, as well as eq-
uity-interest holders; (e) the availability of the "cram down" power to
confirm a plan of reorganization over dissenting classes of creditors
or equity-interest holders; (f) a statutory and extensive role for the
" Miller & Ryland, supra note 39, at 214.
54 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. at 905.
55 Miller & Ryland, supra note 39, at 214.
66 See SIC EEL, supra note 18, at 119-21. See generally Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat.
840 (1938), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
sr Jeb Barnes, Bankrupt Bargain? Bankruptcy Reform and the Politics of Adversarial Legalism,
13 J.L. & Poi.. 893, 907 n.72 (1997).
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SEC; (g) an extended process for the development and proposal of a
plan of reorganization; (h) a first right on the part of the reorganiza-
tion trustee to propose a plan of reorganization; (i) a requirement
that the district court determine that a proposed plan was worthy of
consideration before solicitation of acceptances could proceed; (j) no
statutory committees of creditors or equity-interest holders; and (k) a
broad comprehensive discharge. 58
In answer to the perceived corruption that occurred in some of
the equity receivership reorganization cases and its effect on the op-
eration of protective committees that had been uncovered by the SEC
study, Chapter X introduced the principle of disinterestedness. 59 Re-
organization fiduciaries such as trustees and appointed professionals
were required to document their disinterestedness as a condition to
employment and by implication, to allowances and the payment of
compensation.° Management and, in effect, the board of directors
were displaced by the mandatory appointment of a reorganization
trustee, and there was a significant loss of control by traditional power
groups.6i Skeel characterized this power shift as follows: "Out were
private negotiation and the wiles of Wall Street, in was pervasive gov-
ernmental oversight."62 The SEC rigidly exercised oversight as to the
requirement of disinterestedness.° As a result of the extensive statu-
tory provisions and prerequisites to the proposal of a plan of reor-
ganization, its acceptance, and ultimately, its consummation, Chapter
X cases extended over a long period of time. 64 The combination of
the above factors had the effect of discouraging corporations from
entering into Chapter X cases.
55 See Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, §§ 167-68, 52 Stat. 840, 890, repealed by
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95.598, 92 Stat. 2549; SREEL, supra note 18, at
119-27; Miller & Waisman, supra note 22, at 169-70.
59 See Miller & Waisman, supra note 22, at 169-70.
6° Id. at 169.
61 See id.; see also SKsEL, supra note 18, at 119-20 ("The act gave the trustee explicit
authority to take over the business activities of the bankrupt firm; and the new law took the
power to formulate a reorganization plan out of the hands of the creditors and vested it in
the trustee. Creditors and other parties could, in theory, make suggestions to the trustee;
but the trustee, and the trustee alone, was the one who would develop the terms of any
reorganization.") (citation omitted).
ss See SKEEI„ supra note 18, at 122.
° Id.
64 Id. at 171 ("The effect of SEC's tardiness was to exacerbate the delay that already
characterized cases that were handled in Chapter X. This made Chapter XI look even bet-
ter to bankruptcy lawyers and the bankruptcy court."); Harvey R. Miller & Alan N. Res-
nick, Commentary on Professor Warren's Paper: Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN. SURV. Am. L. 49, 50
(1992).
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Management, fearful of being displaced, would delay the com-
mencement of bankruptcy cases.° Often, during this process, the dete-
rioration of the debtor's business would continue unabated and some-
times result in the loss of the ability to reorganize and rehabilitate. In
1938, more than 500 corporations commenced cases under Chapter
X.66
 By 1944, that number had dropped to sixty-eight. 67 During the
1950s and 1960s, the number of Chapter X cases each year fluctuated
around one hundred.° The effect of the rigid requirements of Chapter
X encouraged distressed business corporations and their professionals
to consider the availability of relief under Chapter XI of the Chandler
Act. Chapter XI did not mandate the appointment of a reorganization
trustee and often permitted the debtor's management to stay in control
of the affairs of the debtor as a debtor-in-possession. 69 In Chapter XI
cases, equity-interest holders often were able to retain their interests."
In addition, Chapter XI provided no statutory role for the SEC."
C. Chapter XI
As the economy of the United States expanded following the
Second World War and credit became more accessible, the occur-
rence of bankruptcy filings increased." Given the unattractiveness of
Chapter X, those experiencing credit defaults explored the possibility
of resorting to relief under Chapter XI of the Chandler Act. Chapter
X1 contemplated a plan to arrange the debtor's unsecured debts and
liabilities in an attempt to enable the debtor to satisfy those obliga-
tions. It did not necessarily displace management." Most importantly,
debtors had a virtually unlimited exclusive right to file a plan of ar-
rangement. 74 The alternative to a plan of arrangement was liquidation
with potentially significant loss of value, This power acted as a de facto
"cram down" and was used by debtors and their professionals to drive
the terms of a plan of arrangement or to extend the term of a Chap-
ter XI case. In addition, the "fair and equitable" rule that had origi-
1' 5 See Miller 8c Waisman, supra note 22, at 169-70.
66 SKEEL, supra note 18, at 125.
67 Id.
69 Id.
69 Id.
7° Id. at 125-27.
71 SKEEL, supra note 18, at 125-27.
72 jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss, The Increasing Bankruptcy Filing Rate: An
Historical Analysis, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1,1 (1993).
73 SKEEL, supra note 18, at 125-27,161-63.
74 See id. at 163.
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nally been a part of Chapter XI was repealed in 1952. 75 As a conse-
quence, a plan of arrangement could provide for equity-interest hold-
ers to retain their interests despite a less-than-full recovery by credi-
tors.
Chapter XI was designed to provide an efficient, expeditious, and
economical vehicle for a small, generally privately owned business en-
terprise or an individual that desired to modify and discharge unse-
cured debts. 76 It did not provide any specific authority to effectuate
the rights of secured creditors or, theoretically, equity-interest holders.
As distressed business corporations and their professionals sought
to avoid Chapter X, they explored and pursued means to expand the
scope of Chapter XI to reorganize and rehabilitate the corporations'
business. The SEC zealously fought the use of Chapter XI for publicly
owned corporations, to protect, first., public stockholders and, thereaf-
ter, public bondholders. The Supreme Court, however, held that pub-
licly owned corporations could use Chapter XI for the purpose of reor-
ganization if that form of bankruptcy served the "needs" of the
corporation.77 The creativity and ingenuity developed in connection
with the application of the provisions of Chapter XI to large, complex
business entities had the effect of transforming Chapter XI from a
debtor-relief chapter intended for small "mom and pop" businesses
with small amounts of unsecured liabilities, to a reorganization vehicle
used by Fortune 500 corporations. 78
II. THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978 AND THE
EMPHASIS ON REHABILITATION
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the "1978 Act"), which en-
acted the current Bankruptcy Code, was signed by President Jimmy
Carter on November 6, 1978 and took effect on October 1, 1979. 79 The
1978 Act was both the first bankruptcy legislation not enacted on the
75 Id. at 124, 167.
76 Id. at 125-27.
77 See Gen. Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462, 466 (1956) ("A large company with
publicly held securities may have as much need for a simple composition of unsecured
debts as a smaller company. And there is no reason we can see why c. XI may not serve that
end. The essential difference is not between the small company and the large company
but between the needs to be served.").
76 See SKEEL, supra note 18, at 127.
" Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (effective Oct. 1, 1979) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2000)),
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heels of domestic economic turmoilw and the first comprehensive re-
form of federal bankruptcy law since the passage of the Chandler Act.
A decade in the making, the final version of the 1978 Act was the cul-
mination of separate drafting efforts by a congressional commission,
the House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate, and the National Asso-
ciation of Bankruptcy Judges. A primary catalyst for this flurry of activ-
ity to revamp bankruptcy law was a 1971 study conducted by the Brook-
ings Institution, which called upon Congress to rethink the bankruptcy
process completely.81 Although the Brookings Institution study was
primarily focused on consumer (individual) bankruptcies following the
explosion of consumer credit during the 1960s, the National Bank-
ruptcy Review Commission, appointed in 1970, included many of the
Brookings Institution's recommendations to overhaul the business re-
organization process under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (as amended
by the Chandler Act) in its report.82
The 1978 Act codified a new Chapter 11 of a new title 11 of the
U.S. Code, which remains the general template for corporate reorgani-
zations and represents the combination of certain aspects of chapters
X, XI, and XII of the Chandler Act. Congress intended Chapter 11 to
eliminate the controversy that often surrounded a debtor's choice of a
particular chapter: "[a] single chapter for all business reorganizations
will simplify the law by eliminating unnecessary differences in detail
that are inevitable under separately administered statutes...." and "will
eliminate unprofitable litigation over the preliminary issue as to which
of [chapters X or XI] apply."83 It was also designed to respond to the
widely held grievance that "existing law did not have adequate mecha-
nisms to facilitate corporate rehabilitation in a straightforward, pre-
dictable way:84 The new Chapter 11 combined the flexibility and
debtor control that characterized Chapter XI with many of the public
protection features central to Chapter X. 85
80 Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 32 (1995).
81 SKEEt., supra note 18, at 142.
82
 See id. at 143.
93 S. REP. No. 95-989, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5795.
84
 Bruce G. Carruthers & Terence C. Halliday, Professionals in Systemic Reform of Bank-
ruptcy Law: The 1978 U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the English Insolvency Act 1986, 74 AM. BAN KR.
L.J. 35, 44 (2000).
93 I WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2n § 3:13
(perm. ed., rev. vol. 2005).
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A. Encouraging Rehabilitation Through Debtor Protections
Among the principal objectives of the 1978 Act were to make bank-
ruptcy a more appealing option than it had been in the past and address
the "great stresses ... in the bankruptcy system"96 that had arisen as both
the number of bankruptcy filings, as well as their complexity, increased.
Offering court-supervised reorganization procedures, the 1978 Act was
designed to provide "bankrupt businesses another opportunity to suc-
ceed. "87 Two issues predominated the adoption of the more flexible,
streamlined, and rehabilitation-friendly Chapter 11: (1) whether to
mandate trustees for large debtors and (2) the appropriate role of the
SEC.99 The resolution of both issues reflected Chapter 11's strong pre-
sumption in favor of the debtor-in-possession concept. Under the 1978
Act, trustees may be appointed only for cause, reflecting Congress' view
that, absent fraud or incompetence, reorganization would be best effec-
tuated by allowing the debtor to continue to operate its business as
debtor-in-possession. 89 Even if a trustee is appointed, the court may, at
any point before confirmation, terminate the trustee's appointment and
restore the debtor-in-possession to management and operation of the
business.9° As for the SEC, Chapter 11 provided no specific statutory role
other than the ability to participate as a party-in-interest. 93
 Chapter 11
thus eliminated SEC oversight of the reorganization process. 92
Other provisions further enhanced the "comfort zone" that Chap-
ter 11 provided to debtors and management and encouraged filing be-
fore a debtor's financial position deteriorated beyond the point that
rehabilitation would no longer be feasible. 93
 Such enhancements in-
cluded: (a) the automatic stay of action against the debtor, its proper-
ties, and properties in the possession of the debtor upon commence-
86 S. REP. No. 95-989, at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5789.
97 Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Cut. L. REV. 775, 787 (1987).
86 See SKEEI., supra note 18, at 177.
B9 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 233 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6192
("[V] ery often the creditors will be benefited by continuation of the debtor in possession,
both because the expense of a trustee will not be required, and the debtor, who is familiar
with his business, will be better able to operate it during the reorganization case.").
9° See 11 U.S.C. § 1105 (2000).
91 Ali M. M. Mojdehi, Appraising Postconfirmation Leaders: The Underutilized Confirmation
Requitement, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 199, 207-08 (2003).
92 Id. at 206-07.
93 Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 98
HARv. L. Ray. 1121, 1126 & n.30 (1983) (citing 123 CONG. REC. 35, 446, (1977) (statement
of Rep. Edwards) and noting that both chapters X and XI required the debtor to be insol-
vent).
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ment of a Chapter 11 case; 94 (b) the broad financing power available to
debtors;95 (c) the debtor's expanded authorization to reject executory
contracts:" (d) a more comprehensive definition of property of the
estate; 97 (e) the recovery and return of property of the estate trans-
ferred or removed from the debtor's possession prior to the com-
mencement of a Chapter 11 case; 99 (f) the expansion of the debtor's
administrative powers• 99 and (g) the debtor's retention of the exclusive
right to file a proposed plan of reorganization and to solicit accep-
tances of such a plan within 180 days, subject to termination, contrac-
tion, or extension for cause.'"
B. Protection of Non Debtor Interests
Congress was mindful of the interest of other parties affected by
business failures. The legislative history of the 1978 Act demonstrates
that Congress believed that It] he purpose of a business reorganiza-
tion case [under Chapter 11] . . . is to restructure a business's finances
so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs,
pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders: 101 With
the understanding that “[Ileorganization, in its fundamental aspects,
involves the thankless task of determining who should share the losses
incurred by an unsuccessful business and how the values of the estate
should be apportioned among creditors and stockholders... . ", 102 the
1978 Act also provided safeguards to protect the interests of creditors
and public investors. Such provisions reflected Congress' intent to
balance the interests of all parties involved in the Chapter 11 reor-
ganization process.
Non-debtor protections included in the 1978 Act provide that:
(a) the commencement of a Chapter 11 case may be voluntary or in-
voluntary; 193 (b) secured creditors are entitled, if requested, to ade-
quate protection of their interests in property of the estate;" (c) the
goal of a Chapter 11 restructuring is to achieve a consensual plan of
a 11 U.S.C. § 362.
95 See id. § 364.
96 Seel?U.S.C. § 365 (2000).
Or
	 id. § 541.
" Id. §§ 542-43.
See id. §§ 361-366.
199 Id. § 1121.
'°' H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 220 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179.
102 S. REP. No. 95-989, at 10 (1978), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5796.
103 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (2000).
'° Id. §§ 361, 363.
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reorganization accepted by certain requisite majorities of various
classes of voting-impaired creditors and equity holders; 105 (d) solicita-
tion of acceptances or rejections of a proposed plan may not occur
until a disclosure statement has been approved by the bankruptcy
court, after notice and a hearing, and upon a finding that the state-
ment contains "adequate information" to enable creditors and equity
holders the opportunity to cast an informed vote;IN (e) the•office of
the U.S. trustee (initially as an experimental program and now as a
permanent program) will oversee the administration of Chapter 11
cases; 107 (1) the debtor must provide due process protections, such as
notice and a hearing, to creditors prior to obtaining the entry of or-
ders and judgments;1 °8 and (g) the plan must fully comply with
confirmation requirements, including an expanded feasibility stan-
dard and a best-interests-of-creditors testi°
Congress also appreciated that the revival of an otherwise failing
business served interests of non-creditors, including older employees,
customers, suppliers, and property owners. 110 As Harvard Law School
Professor Elizabeth Warren has observed, Iciongressional comments
on the Bankruptcy Code are liberally sprinkled with discussions of poli-
cies to 'protect the investing public, protect jobs, and help save trou-
bled businesses,' of concern about the community impact of bank-
ruptcy, and of 'the public interest' beyond the interests of the disputing
parties."'"
1°5 See id. § 1126.
106 Id. § 1125.
l°7 Id. § 307.
1" FEU. R. RANIER. P. 2002. For a definition of "notice and a hearing," see 11 U.S.C.•
§ 102.
109 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1129 (2000); In re Gen. Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers
Union, Local 890, 265 F.3d 869, 877 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Kane v. johns-Manville Corp.
(In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 649 (2d Cir. 1988) (swing that the best inter-
ests test requires "a finding that each holder of a claim or interest either has accepted the
plan or has received no less under the plan than what he would have received in a Chapter
7 liquidation").
110 Warren, supra note 87, at 787-87.
111 Id. at 788 & n.24 (quoting 124 CoNG. REC. 32392 (1978) (statement of Rep. Ed-
wards)); see H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 53-62 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6014-23
(letter from judge Conrad Cyr responding to congressional request for information about
cases with special community impact); H.R. Doc. No. 93--137, at 72 (1973); 129 CONG,
REC. 33990 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
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C. Judicial Interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code
From the outset, the Bankruptcy Codell 2 was understood to be a
flexible document, with its provisions to be shaped and interpreted to
meet the needs of the Congressional policy of furthering rehabilita-
tion. Early caselaw illustrates the manner in which policy considera-
tions behind the 1978 Act encouraged a pragmatic view and applica-
tion of the Bankruptcy Code.
In United States u Whiting Pools, Inc., 113 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, relying upon the policy considerations of the 1978 Act
as well as on sections 541 and 542 of the Bankruptcy Code as statutory
predicates, expanded the power of the debtor to obtain a turnover or-
der under section 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code." 4 The debtor in
Whiting Pools, pursuant to section 542 of the Bankruptcy Code, sought
to require the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to turn over property
that it had levied shortly before Whiting filed for bankruptcy." 5 Whit-
ing was in the business of selling, installing, and servicing swimming
pool equipment, and the IRS, acting pursuant to Internal Revenue
Code § 6331, seized and took control of all of Whiting's tangible prop-
erty, including equipment, vehicles, inventory, office equipment, and
supplies, all of which were "absolutely necessary to an effective reor-
ganization of the debtor."" 8 The estimated worth of the seized property
in the control of Whiting as a going concern was $162,876, the IRS lien
was for approximately $92,000 plus interest, and the estimated liquida-
tion value for the property was, at most, $35,000, with a high likelihood
that sale proceeds would be in the $20,000 range. 117
The IRS argued that the plain meaning of section 542 did not
mandate turnover in this case because, at the commencement of the
case, the debtor's interests in the property were only those set out in
the IRS levy statute, namely a right to notice of the seizure/sale, re-
demption prior to sale, and a right to surplus proceeds." 8 The Second
Circuit disregarded the IRS's "mechanical interpretation," determin-
ing that "the Government's reading of the Bankruptcy Code would
seriously affect the chances of success in many reorganizations.... In
152 Seell U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (2000).
"a 674 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1982), affd, 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
114
 See generally id.
116 Id. at 145-46.
116 Id. (quoting United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. (In re Whiting Pools, Inc.), 10 B.R.
755,757 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981)).
"7 id.
116 Id. at 149-50.
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light of legislative history indicating that reorganizations were to be
encouraged under the new Code, we doubt that Congress intended
such a result." The court instead found that a narrow definition of
property of the estate would have a "far-reaching effect on reorganiza-
tions by denying to debtors or trustees in reorganization not only the
power to obtain the turnover of property of the debtor levied upon by
the IRS, but also that repossessed prior to bankruptcy by secured
creditors or held by pledgees after a default."'"
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's holding,
thereby upholding the debtor's right to regain possession and use of
property necessary to its ongoing business and generally prioritizing
the ability of a debtor to restructure successfully over the ability of the
federal government to collect taxes. 121 The Court echoed the Second
Circuit's concern for a flexible approach to interpreting the Bank-
ruptcy Code in order to facilitate reorganization: "By permitting reor-
ganization, Congress anticipated that the business would continue to
provide jobs, to satisfy creditors' claims, and to produce a return for
its owners."122 The Court also emphasized the breadth of the
definition of "property of the estate" in the context of the legislative
history of the 1978 Act, stating that "rbloth the congressional goal of
encouraging reorganizations and Congress' choice of methods to pro-
tect secured creditors suggest that Congress intended a broad range
of property to be included in the estate." 123
In NLRB u Bildisco & Bildisco, the Supreme Court again empha-
sized the policy goals of the Bankruptcy Code: "[t] he fundamental
purpose of reorganization is to prevent a debtor from going into liq-
uidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of eco-
I'9 Id. at 150, 152 & n.13 (citing 123 CONG. REC. H. 11,697 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1977)).
129 Whiting Pools, Inc., 674 F.2d at 150.
/91 See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 211-12 (1983).
122 Id. at 203 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 220 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6179).
129 Id. at 203-04. Interestingly, the Supreme Court also interpreted the IRS levy statute
to narrow the IRS's interest in the property to that of a right to legal custody and nothing
more, rejecting the IRS's contention that the debtor's interests in the property were only,
for instance, a right to notice of the seizure/sale or a right to surplus proceeds. See id. at
210-11 (In fact, the tax sale provision itself refers to the debtor as the owner of the prop.
erty after the seizure but prior to the sale. Until such a sale takes place, the property re-
mains the debtor's and thus is subject to the turnover requirement of § 542 (a).") (citation
omitted). It is possible that the Supreme Court was attempting to narrow the Second Cir-
cuit's reliance on a broad definition of "property of the estate" by instead narrowly inter-
preting the IRS's rights to the debtor's property under the IRS levy statute to fall outside of
a less broad definition. Nevertheless, this is unlikely given the Supreme Court's lengthy
discussion of the Bankruptcy Code's policy objectives. See id. at 204.
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nomic resources."'" In a controversial holding, the Court rejected the
argument that collective bargaining agreements are not executory
contracts and, therefore, are beyond the scope of the rejection powers
of section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. 125 The Supreme Court de-
clined to require a debtor to demonstrate that a reorganization would
otherwise fail in order to reject a collective bargaining agreement, 128 a
formulation adopted by the Second Circuit in Brotherhood of Railway v.
REA Express, Inc. 127 The Supreme Court held that, although rejection
of collective bargaining agreements should be governed by a stricter
standard than the business judgment standard applied to other ex-
ecutory contracts because of the special nature of a collective-
bargaining contract and the "law of the shop" it creates, the REA Ex-
press standard was too stringent and therefore "fundamentally at odds
with the policies of flexibility and equity built into Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. "128 The Court thus held that a debtor could rescind
a labor contract immediately upon the commencement of a Chapter
11 case. 129 Unfortunately, the public debate sparked by the Bildisco
decision triggered an immediate congressional response. Congress
promptly passed an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code setting forth
specific procedures and substantive requirements for the rejection of
collective bargaining agreements.'" Section 1113, the amendatory
provision of the Bankruptcy Code that nullified the Bildisco holding,
provides for an expedited form of collective bargaining, the failure of
which is the only avenue for a debtor to reject the labor contract."'
Another case illustrating the doctrine of flexibility is In re Iono-
sphere Clubs, Inc., 132 which is often credited as the seminal case regard-
ing critical-vendor payments and, accordingly, is frequently cited in
support of critical-vendor motions.'" The issue before the court was
124 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 200 (1977)).
i" Id. at 521-23.
126 See id. at 525-27.
127 Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Exp., Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 167-69 (2d Cir.
1975).
128 Bildisco	 Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 525.
129 See id.
1° See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000).
131 In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., 795 F.2d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 1986); sec 11 U.S.C.
§ 1113.
132 98 B.R. 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
In A critical-vendor motion seeks authorization to pay claims of "critical vendors," as
identified by the debtor and approved by the court. Critical vendors are those who "supply
services or material essential to the conduct of the [debtor's] business," such that their
continued participation in the debtor's business is necessary for the debtor's ability to
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whether the debtor, Eastern Airlines, was required to pay the prepeti-
tion wage, salary, and medical benefit claims of all employees, rather
than only the claims of active, non-striking employees the debtor con-
sidered to be critical for continued operations.'" According to the
International Association of Machinists, the prepetition wage and sal-
ary claims of both active and striking employees were priority claims
under section 507(a) (3) of the Bankruptcy Code and thus should be
treated in the same fashion. 135
The court, however, held that "[a] rigid application of the priori-
ties of § 507 would be inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of
reorganization" 1" and the "paramount policy and goal of Chapter 11,
to which all other bankruptcy policies are subordinated ..., [which] is
the rehabilitation of the debtor." 137 In denying relief for non-critical
employees and allowing the debtor to make payments solely to active,
non-striking employees, the court relied on the equitable power pro-
vided by section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, as well as on section
363(b), which empowers a bankruptcy court to authorize a debtor to
expend funds outside the ordinary course of business.'" According to
the court, its use of section 105 in this context went to the very pur-
pose of the Bankruptcy Act's grant of equitable powers to the bank-
ruptcy court, which was "to create a flexible mechanism that will per-
mit the greatest likelihood of survival of the debtor and payment of
creditors in full or at least proportionately."139
As these cases make clear, rehabilitation and reorganization were
the policy goals underlying the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. In
the early years following the 1978 Act, judges did not hesitate to in-
terpret the Bankruptcy Code and exercise their perceived equity pow-
ers to achieve and implement that policy.
reorganize successfully. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1989) (quoting In re Lehigh & New Eng. Ry. Co., 657 F.2d 570, 581 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting
In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 467 F.2d 100, 102 n.1 (3d Cir. 1972))). According to the
court in In in Ionosphere Clubs, Int., the debtor must "articulate sound business reasons" that
snake it "critical for [the debtor] to pay such pre-petition claims in order to preserve and
protect its business and ultimately reorganize." Id. at 175. The propriety of such payments
and the legal reasoning supporting such payments recently has been criticized. See, e.g., In
in Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871-74 (7th Cir. 2004); In re Coserv, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487,
493-95 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
"4 In in Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. at 174-75.
135 Id. at 175.
133 Id. at 178 (quoting In re Chateaugay, 80 B.R. 279, 287 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
1" Id. at 176.
138 Id. at 178.
"9 Id. (quoting In re Chateaugay, 80 B.R. at 287).
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III. THE DECLINING EMPHASIS ON REHABILITATION
A. The "Clawback" by Creditors and Parties in Interest
The passage of the 1978 Act ushered in a new era of special-
interest legislation designed to meet the needs of a variety of parties.
Congress responded to pressures from various special interests by pass-
ing specific provisions to protect a particular special-interest group.
Thus began the contraction of debtor protections to achieve the con-
gressional policy of rehabilitation and reorganization. Ultimately, the
enactment of such special-interest provisions motivated other groups to
obtain statutory amendments to protect their interests and the "claw-
back" protections and powers extended to the debtors.
Purportedly to maintain affordable access for airlines to lease
and finance acquisitions of aircraft, section 1110 of the Bankruptcy
Code provides aircraft manufacturers, lessors, and financiers with ad-
ditional protections. 14° Section 1110 is a provision paralleled to sec-
tion 1168, which originated in section 77(j) of the 1978 Act, and was
passed in response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Continental Illi-
nois National Bank v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway, 141 that a
creditor's right to foreclose on a particular railroad asset could be en-
joined to preserve going-concern value. 142 Section 1110 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code provides an exception to the automatic stay provision of
section 362, allowing financiers to bypass the stay to receive current
payments or recover the financed aircraft-related equipment. 143 Sup-
posedly, two negative consequences would arise if the section 1110
exception did not exist: (1) airlines would face prohibitive increases
in the cost of aircraft leases—driven by lessors' and financiers' need to
account for such risk—and (2) airlines would be unable to acquire
new aircraft readily to service additional markets, compete with other
airlines, or upgrade aging equipment.'" It has been argued that, as a
result of the section 1110 protections and despite the chronic
financial problems plaguing the airline sector, a competitive market
for aircraft-related financing developed that benefited the airline in-
dustry and the public. The empirical evidence to support this argu-
ment, however, is inconclusive.
to 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (2000).
141 294 U.S. 648 (1935).
"2 11 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1168.
143 Kathryn Hoff-Patrinos, Aviation Finance Revisited: The 1994 Amendments to Section
WO of the Bankruptcy Code, 69 A.M. BANKR. L.J. 167,168-69 (1995).
14 I See 11 U .S.C. § 1110.
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Certain financial institutions receive special protection under the
Bankruptcy Code. Safeguards are designed to provide incentives for
such institutions to enter into transactions with financially troubled
companies, to preserve the liquidity of the nation's financial markets,
and to remove the uncertainties of bankruptcy as a limiting factor in
the formation and execution of such transactions. For example, the
Bankruptcy Code grants financial institutions that conduct derivative
transactions the right to set off mutual claims despite the automatic
stay and permits them to exercise otherwise unenforceable ipso facto
provisions. 195
Commercial property owners also receive special protections un-
der the Bankruptcy Code. 148 While section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code
generally allows a debtor to delay its decision to assume or reject an ex-
ecutory contract until confirmation of its plan of reorganization, sec-
tion 365(d) (4) limits the time within which a debtor may assume a
lease of nonresidential property to sixty days from the date of com-
mencement of the Chapter 11 case, subject to extension for cause. 147 In
addition to the sixty-day limitation of section 365(d) (4), shopping cen-
ter lessors have received further protections pertaining to the assump-
tion of leases within their shopping centers, in the form of adequate
assurance of performance provisions."8 Such protections, codified in
section 365(b) (3), are justified by proponents by the interdependen-
cies among tenants of shopping centers and the resulting impact that
each tenant has on others. 149
Equipment lessors are also protected by section 365(d) (10) of
the Bankruptcy Code, adopted in 1994, under which a debtor is obli-
gated to make all payments required under a lease of personal prop-
erty arising sixty days after the commencement of the Chapter 11
case.'" This provision is designed to protect such a lessor from a
debtor who retains the lessor's property and attempts to limit the les-
sor's administrative expense claiM through section 503 (b) (1), which
145 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b) (6), 362(b) (7), 555, 556, 559, & 560. These sections of
the Code were adopted in 1978, 1978, 1982, 1982, 1984, and 1990, respectively, and subse-
quently expanded.
146
 Sec 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2000).
147 Id. § 365(d) (4).
"a See id. § 365(b) (3).
149 Id.; John D. Ayer et al., Bankruptcy Issues for Landlords and Tenants, AM. BANKR. INST.
J., Oct. 2004, at 16, 54-55.
159 SeellU.S.C.§ 365(d) (10).
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allows for administrative expenses that are the "actual, necessary costs
and expenses of preserving the estate."'"
B. The Creditor-in-Possession
The increasing influence of creditors has fundamentally changed
the reorganization process, with wide-ranging and far-reaching effects
both prior to and during a company's decision to commence a Chapter
11 case. This Section identifies and analyzes two contributing causes:
(1) distressed-debt trading and (2) debtor-in-possession financing.
Distressed-debt trading has grown to proportions never contem-
plated when the 1978 Act was enacted. It has meaningfully trans-
formed the relationship between debtors and creditors. In the 1970s
and 1980s, that relationship was generally symbiotic. Prior to global-
ization and technological advancements such as the Internet, suppli-
ers, purchasers, and lenders often shared long-standing commercial
relationships and, as a result of geographic limitations, were confined
to the same areas and local economies. The interdependent nature of
fortunes encouraged support when a local enterprise commenced a
reorganization case, as it was in the best interests of suppliers and
lenders to continue providing materials, products, and support.
The globalization of the economy and the growth of financial
markets have fueled distressed-debt trading, 152 a phenomenon that
has upset the symbiotic relationship between a debtor and its credi-
tors. Unsophisticated suppliers who are unwilling to navigate the re-
covery of their claims through the Chapter 11 process now easily liq-
uidate their claims by selling them for cash at a discount to distressed-
debt traders. 15' Creditor financial institutions no longer feel con-
151 See id. § 503(b) (1); Ayer et al., supra note 149, at 54.
I" The onset of large-scale debt trading is generally attributed to the 1991 amendment
to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(e). Before 1991, claimants had greater
access to information that enabled them to make informed decisions on whether they
should sell their claims. By contrast, the current version of Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e) no
longer requires the disclosure of the "terms of the transfer" and "the consideration there-
for," which were viewed as frustrating the goal of providing a liquid market for the sale of
claims. Today, Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e) simply requires the transferee to provide evidence
of the transfer to the court. Fen. R. BANKR. P. 3001(c); Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reor-
ganization Cases and the Delaware Myth, 55 VAND. L. Rev. 1987,2015-16 (2002).
155 Even to the extent that trade creditors do not sell their claims and are willing to work
patiently with the debtor to ensure its rehabilitation, trade creditors' role in Chapter 11 cases
appears to be waning. For example, one would expect Winn-Dixie, a grocery retailer with
goods comprising its main cost of doing business, to have a large proportion of trade debt.
Instead, the trade debt accounted for only roughly twenty percent of Winn-Dixie's debt at the
commencement of its Chapter 11 cases. See generally In is Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., No. 05—
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strained by relationships with management and may choose not to
carry large defaulted loans, which must be marked to market with at-
tendant financial statement charges to the lender. Accordingly,
financial institutions often seek liquidity and lower risk, and thus sell
the debt notwithstanding any prior relationship with a particular
debtor.
Distressed-debt traders have different motivations from commer-
cial creditors providing goods and services or lenders. They buy
claims of all types at substantial discounts. Rather than nurture long-
term relationships, distressed-debt traders purchase debt claims to
reap material profits and, in certain situations, to obtain control of
the debtor and dominate the administration of the reorganization
case through membership on the creditors' committee. In either case,
the perspective of the distressed-debt trader is that time is of critical
importance in order to maximize the return on investment. The
sooner a trader or a group of traders can force a debtor to emerge
from Chapter 11, the sooner the traders' claims can be monetized—
regardless of any other factor, including. whether or not the debtor
had been fully rehabilitated when it was pressured to exit the Chapter
11 reorganization process. This paradigm may be a material contrib-
uting factor to the recidivism rate and Chapter 11 debtors' eventual
return to the bankruptcy court.
Distressed-debt traders, primarily hedge funds, constitute a sophis-
ticated set of players in the Chapter 11 arena who continue to grow in-
creasingly familiar with Chapter 11 and who are unwilling to sacrifice
recovery for the sake of the debtor's rehabilitation. Distressed-debt
traders' entry into the reorganization process has transformed Chapter
11 reorganizations from primarily rehabilitation to the fulfillment of
laissez-faire capitalism focused on the realization of substantial profit-
taking.
hi tandem with the growing dominance of the distressed-debt trad-
ers/hedge funds, lenders, including hedge funds who increasingly have
supplanted banks and other financial institutions, have also grown in-
creasingly sophisticated in gaining influence and control over a debtor
through debtor-in-possession financing ("DIP financing"). DIP financing
agreements generally take the form of a revolving credit facility, with
amounts borrowed due on a regular and relatively short-term basis.'"
11063 (RDD) (Sankt.. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2005) (first-day affidavit of Bennett L. Nussbaum
reporting total liabilities of $L9 billion, but accounts payable of only $410 million as of Janu-
ary 12, 2005, approximately five weeks before the Chapter 11 filing).
154 See generally id.
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They typically include regular reporting requirements to allow the lend-
ers to evaluate the debtor's performance frequently and to determine
whether the loan should be rolled over.'" Because debtors that file for
Chapter 11 protection increasingly have balance sheets that are encum-
bered by large amounts of secured debt—meaning they have a real need
to turn to DIP financing,'" negotiations over DIP loan agreements have
become more and more one-sided, with lenders' leverage substantially
enhanced by pre-Chapter 11 liens and security interests. Such leverage
has enabled DIP lenders to impose increasingly severe covenants and
conditions on the debtor and its activities to the point that control of the
Chapter 11 case has been taken away from the bankruptcy court.t 57
For example, a DIP lender may insist that the debtor hire a chief
restructuring officer ("CRO"). 158 CROs are typically vested with execu-
tive decision-making power and direct access to the debtor's board, but
they can talk to the lenders without reporting back to the board. Many
DIP loan provisions can constrain management flexibility and pressure
the debtor into selling its assets. A DIP lender may insist upon, for ex-
ample, highly restrictive cash flow covenants in the loan agreement.'"
Other examples include drop-dead dates, events of default, negative
covenants, and consent requirements that may go so far as to prohibit
the filing of a Chapter 11 plan without the prior written consent of the
lenders.'"
The Chapter 11 process is increasingly dominated by the "credi-
tor-in-possession," which may explain recidivism rates that have been
calculated to be as high as 42% in some districtsP Despite the feasi-
155 See generally id
' 56 See David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors' Ball: The "New" New Corporate Governance in Chapter
11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 925 (2003).
157 See Harvey R. Miller et al., Debtor Dispossessed: The Rise of the "Creditor-In-
Possession" and Chapter 11 Asset Sales—Does Chapter 11 Have a Future for Debtors? 13-
I6 (Mar. 20, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).
156 Id. at 13.
156 For example, the management of United Airlines was compelled to terminate
much of its workforce and renegotiate its collective bargaining agreement in order to
comply with the cash flow requirements of the company's DIP agreement. Id. at 13-14.
166 See Marcia L. Goldstein at al., Current Issues in Debtor in Possession Financing, in DEAL-
ING wrrn SECURED CLAIMS & STRUCTURED FINANCIAL. PRODUCTS IN BANKRUPTCY CASES
2003, at 147, 154 (2003). Have we returned to the practices characterized as "evils" in the
1930s SEC study of the protective committees and equity receiverships? See generally U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM O N, REPORT ON '111E STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF no. WORK, ACTIVI-
TIES, PERSONNEL, AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES
[PART 1] (1937).
161 Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y Waisman, The Creditor in Possession, BANKR, STRATEGIST,
Nov. 2003, at 1, 2, 6, 7.
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bilk), requirement of section 1129 (a) (11) of the Bankruptcy Code,
the bankruptcy judge is dependent upon the parties to present the
necessary facts, upon which the judge will either confirm or deny a
plan. Courts do not have the means to assess independently a plan's
feasibility when presented and supported by the debtors and the
creditors. To a large degree, the bankruptcy judge is a captive of the
parties, even when a group of creditors exerts a disproportionate
influence on the process.
Management is often unable to counterbalance the influence of
creditors in Chapter 11. At the outset, management, fearing a loss of
control in the current environment, is often reluctant to commence a
Chapter 11 case, often waiting only until the last moment to use Chap-
ter 11, which could be after the debtor has a realistic chance of being
rehabilitated. Conversely, once a Chapter 11 case has commenced,
management often has every incentive to cooperate with lenders. Per-
Imps senior management is simply reading the proverbial "writing on
the wall." At the outset of many cases, it is often obvious that creditors
will eventually own the reorganized debtor. Managements desiring a
future role with the reorganized debtor will, therefore, have an incen-
tive to appease their future owners, 162 Other times, lenders are able to
change the debtor's management team to their advantage. An empiri-
cal study found that, during times of financial distress, there is a 52%
likelihood of senior management turnover in any year in which the
debtor declares bankruptcy or engages in an out-of-court restructur-
ing.163 The same study found that lenders were responsible one out of
every five times such management changes occurred.'"
Accordingly, creditors (increasingly in the form of distressed-debt
traders), consistent with the adage that time is money and facing little
resistance, often pressure a debtor to emerge quickly from Chapter 11
and push the debtor to formulate and present hastily a plan of reor-
ganization. All too often this occurs before the remedial work has
been done, so the reorganized debtor fails once again. The result is
162 See Miller et al., supra note 157, at 17.
163 See Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in Financially Distressed
Firms: Empirical Evidence, 72 WASII. U. L.Q. 1005, 1011 (1994) (citing Stuart C. Gilson,
Management Thrnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN. EcoN. 241 (1989)),
'el Id.; see Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporals Governance in the Bank-
ruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. Ps. L. REV, 669, 737 (1993)
(finding that creditors participated in eighteen of forty CEO firings in large publicly
traded firms that filed for Chapter 11).
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Chapter 22, sometimes Chapter 33, to use proverbial characteriza-
tions. 165
C. The Increasing Prevalence of Section 363(b) Sales
The prevalence of asset sales under section 363(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code 166 in the context of Chapter 11 is attributable to many fac-
tors besides increasingly powerful creditors. Robust capital markets fa-
cilitate the pooling of massive amounts of capital by groups of investors,
typically in the form of alternative investment vehicles such as private
equity and leveraged buyout funds, hedge funds, and vulture funds, in
order to purchase or control companies of sizes previously not thought
possible (for example, RJR Nabisco, Kmart, Toys "R" Us, Sungard). Ad-
ditionally, with the ability of such funds to cooperate, few companies
are outside the realm of acquisition possibility based on size. Assets are
increasingly fungible, implying that the number of potential buyers of
assets of any Chapter 11 debtor is growing. The Bankruptcy Code itself
creates incentives to engage in asset sales; because section 363 offers
the ability to convey assets "free and clear," a debtor sometimes may file
for Chapter 11 to implement a sale of all or substantially all of its assets
under section 363(b) without any intention to attempt a rehabilitation
of the business. 167 This unique ability to cleanse the assets of a dis-
tressed company attracts potential purchasers because it potentially
removes the uncertainty of successor liability, fraudulent transfer
claims, and lien issues that often accompanies asset purchases. Chapter
11 thus facilitates the creation of a market for the sale.
Notwithstanding the foregoing factors, the creditor-in-possession
phenomenon has certainly contributed to the increasing prevalence
of bankruptcy sales. Creditors often prefer Chapter 11 as a mecha-
166
 See generally In re US Airways Group. No. 02-83984 (SSM) (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002); In
re Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 01-00056 (PJW) (Bankr. D. Del. 2001); in re US Airways
Group, No. 02-83984 (SSM) (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997); In re Jamesway Corp., No. 95-44821
(REG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re jamesway Corp., No. 93-43697 (JLG) (Baniu^. S.D.N.Y.
1993); In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 92-00115 (HSB) (Bankr. D. Del. 1992).
166 See generally In re AT&T Latin Am. Corp., No. 03-13538 (RAM) (Bankr. S.D. Fl.
2003); In re Top-Flite, Inc., No. 03-12003 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. 2003); In re Velocita
Corp., No. 02-35895 (DF1S) (Bankr. D.N.J. 2002); In re Budget Group, No. 02-12152
(MEW) (Bankr. D. Del. 2002); In re Loews Cineplex Entm't Corp., No. 01-40346 (ALG)
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. 01-15288 (BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2001); In re Polaroid Corp., No. 01-10864 (JPW) (Bankr. D. Del. 2001); in re ANC Rental
Corp., No. 01-11200 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. 2001); In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., No.
01-00056 (PJW) (Bankr. D. Del. 2001).
161
 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 9, at 751-52 (citing the bankruptcies of Trans World
Airlines and Enron).
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nism to facilitate asset sales rather than as a tool for reorganization,
given that immediate sales produce a greater certainty of return. Dis-
tressed-debt traders, for example, often consider an extended Chap-
ter 11 process to be undesirable, given that their primary concern is
achieving a quick return on their investments. DIP lenders, which are
often senior secured creditors, also may favor asset sales in Chapter
11, given that they face limited upside potential but significant down-
side risk from an extended Chapter 11 case.
D. The Political Environment
Since the mid-1990s, there has been a judicial trend toward
strictly construing and emphasizing the plain meaning of the lan-
guage of the Bankruptcy Code in its application, as opposed to what is
pejoratively described as legislating from the benc11. 168 This trend
emphasizes predictability, rights, and legislative fiat. Creative applica-
tions of the principles and policies of the Bankruptcy Code to further
a debtor's rehabilitation, its proponents argue, cannot be extended by
a bankruptcy court in the absence of express statutory provisions em-
powering the court to provide such relief. This trend stands in stark
contrast to the flexibility and practicality of the bankruptcy courts that
initially interpreted and applied the Bankruptcy Code. The result has
been judicial decisions that ignore the predominant rehabilitation
policy objective that underlies the 1978 Act. This conservative but
currently popular view of the judicial function may hamper the ability
of a debtor to reorganize effectively and also ignores the fact that a
reorganization case is a socioeconomic legal process that requires
flexibility and creativity to achieve the legislative objectives.
Perlman v. Catapult Entertainment, Inc. (In re Catapult Entertainment,
Inc.) 169 is a prime example of the unfortunate consequences of the
strict constructionists. In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that the proper interpretation of section 365 (c) (1) of the
Bankruptcy Code is the plain meaning of its language, which estab-
lishes a so-called hypothetical test to govern the assumption of execu-
tory contracts.'" The decision prevents a debtor, as a debtor-in-
possession, from assuming a non-assignable executory contract, even
169 See, e.g., Scott F. Norberg, Classification of Claims Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code: The Fallacy of Interest Based Classification, 69 AM. BANKR. 14. 119, 126 n.27 (1995);
Foreword to Bankruptcy Developments journal, 10 BANKR, Di:v. J. vii, 	 (1994).
1 " 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999).
179 See id. at 749-50.
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when the debtor has no intention of assigning the contract. 171 The
decision blithely ignores the legal construct that the debtor and the
debtor-in-possession constitute the same entity and, therefore, the en-
tity whose performance the counterparty had voluntarily agreed to
accept. Rather, the decision enables the counterparty to take advan-
tage of the occurrence of Chapter 11 to repudiate the agreement and
obtain a windfall. As a result, the debtor's estate is deprived of the
value of the executory contract to the detriment of all of the debtor's
creditors other than the counterparty. By focusing on the plain mean-
ing of the Bankruptcy Code 172 instead of the underlying policy of re-
habilitation, this decision seriously impairs the ability of Chapter 11
debtors to reorganize by depriving them of the economic benefit of
assuming executory contracts with favorable terms if such contracts
are not hypothetically assignable.'"
Similarly, in United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Fox (In re Fox), 174 the Bank-
ruptcy Appellate Panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held that creditors may not bring derivative suits on behalf of the bank-
ruptcy estate. 175 In so holding, the panel focused on the literal lan-
guage of section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, which authorizes the
trustee to avoid transfers. 176 In choosing not to follow the Third Circuit's
decision in another case, Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Cyber-
genics Corp. v. Chinery, 177 the Fox panel discounted what it at least ac-
knowledged as better policy: "Cybergeracs discusses many reasons why it
would be good policy for parties other than the trustee to bring deriva-
tive complaints, and it is hard to disagree with the reasons set forth by
the majority." The court continued, though, to decline the invitation
to be guided by such policy considerations:
We, however, believe this reasoning is best considered by
Congress, and it is not up to us to create a remedy for credi-
tors it has not granted to them, especially when that right is
171
 See id. at 750.
172 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (2000) ("The trustee may not assume or assign any executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits
or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties ....") (emphasis added).
173 Perlman, 165 F.3d at 753.
174 305 B.R. 912 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004).
176 Id. at 916.
176 See id. at 914-15.
177
 330 F.3d 548, 580 (3d. Cir. 2003).
176 Fox, 305 B.R. at 916.
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given exclusively to the trustee. Here, the statute is absolute
and allows us no discretion to vary from what it says.'"
Instead, the B.A.P. adhered to the plain meaning rule and the Su-
preme Court's admonition in Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Un-
ion Planters Bank, N.A.,'" that a plain and unambiguous statute should
not be embellished.'"
In In re Armstrong World Industries, Inc., the court laid out perhaps
one of the strongest-worded rebukes of judicial flexibility)" After ex-
tensive negotiations, the debtor filed its fourth plan of reorganiza-
tion.'" At issue and a key part of this plan was the consent by the as-
bestos personal injury claimants to share a portion of their proposed
distribution with equity holders.' 84 The bankruptcy court issued pro-
posed findings of fact and conclusions of law along with a proposed
confirmation order, and certain unsecured creditors who had previ-
ously indicated support of the debtor's plan filed objections with the
district court.'" The district court denied confirmation of the plan,
holding that it violated the fair and equitable (absolute priority) rule,
by allowing equity holders to receive the debtor's property on account
of their ownership interest before unsecured creditors had been paid
in full.' The court warned: "Bluntly put, no amount of legal creativ-
ity or counsel's incantation to general notions of equity or to any sup-
posed policy favoring reorganizations over liquidation supports judi-
cial rewriting of the Bankruptcy Code."'"
The growing influence of creditors, particularly secured creditors,
and the increasing emphasis both on enforcing parties' contractual and
statutory rights and on strictly interpreting the plain language of the
Bankruptcy Code, has found unity and intellectual justification in aca-
179 Id. (citation omitted).
180 530 U.S. 1 (2000).
181 Fox, 305 B.R. at 916.
lea Seen.) B.R. 523, 540 (D. Del. 2005).
183 Id. at 525.
IM Id. at 526.
185 See id. at 531.
195 Id. at 536.
187 In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 320 B.R. at 540; see United States v. Sutton, 786
F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) ("While the bankruptcy courts have fashioned relief under
Section 105(a) in a variety of situations, the powers granted by that statute may be exer-
cised only in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. That statute
does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise
unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity.").
160	 Boston College Law Review	 Wol. 47:129
demic circles under the name of "contractualism." 198 Under a contrac-
tual model, there is no need for a court-supervised insolvency process
because the most suitable private party, through contract, is allocated
decision-making responsibility.' 89 Upon default by the borrower (or
even before), control shifts to such party per agreement and this party
makes business decisions such as when to shutter the business. The
contractual model eschews governmental oversight and entrusts private
parties with the responsibility of allocating control rights efficiently.
From this perspective, the control that secured creditors and DIP lend-
ers procure through restrictive terms and conditions of loan agree-
ments is acceptable, even desirable. Some argue that contractualism is
already in place. 19°
N. THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT OF 2005
Representing the most comprehensive set of reforms to the Bank-
ruptcy Code in more than twenty-five years, the Bankruptcy Abuse Pre-
vention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 191 (the "Abuse Act") is
designed to improve bankruptcy law and practice by restoring personal
responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensuring fair-
ness to both debtors and creditors.' 92 The Abuse Act pertains to both
consumer and business bankruptcy and includes provisions intended to
reduce systemic risk in the banking system and financial marketplace,
as well as a separate chapter addressing transnational insolvencies, both
in response to trends in the globalization of business management and
operations and in order to provide greater legal certainty for trade and
investment. 193
President Bush signed the Abuse Act into law on April 20, 2005,
and most provisions took effect on October 17, 2005. 194 The Abuse
198 See, e.g., jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth  in Bankruptcy, 82 TEx. L. REV.
795, 827-30 (2004).
l® See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 9, at 781 (citing Webvan as a paradigmatic
example). One can analogize to the control obtained by DIP lenders over a debtor
through the DIP loan agreement, which, if sufficiently overreaching, allows the DIP lend-
ers the right effectively to run the debtor's operations.
00 Westbrook, supra note 188, at 829.
01 See generally Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (to be codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C.,
18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "BAPCPA"].
192 11.R. REP. No. 109-31 (Part 1), at 1-2 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.CAN. 88, 89.
193 See id. at 2-9, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.CAN. at 89-90.
' 94 See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
20051 	 Is Chapter I1 Bankrupt?	 161
Act represents the culmination of nearly eight years of proposed legis-
lation. The House of Representatives has passed bankruptcy reform
legislation on eight occasions since the 105th Congress,'" and the
Senate has passed legislation on four occasions and has held numer-
ous hearings on the subject of bankruptcy reform.'" Notwithstanding
President Clinton's veto of such legislation during the 106th Con-
gress, bankruptcy reform legislation survived and now has found en-
actment with bipartisan, bicameral support, the lobbying for which
was largely financed by credit card issuers and banks. 197
The legislative history of the Abuse Act indicates several motiva-
tions for reform: (1) an increase in the number of consumer bank-
ruptcy filings and alleged associated creditor losses, as well as adverse
financial consequences for the economy as a whole; (2) the use of
loopholes and other abusive practices; and (3) the lack of a clear
mandate for debtors to repay their debts to the best of their abili-
ties.'" However, whether the Abuse Act does in fact respond to such
"significant developments” 199 has been questioned. According to the
Senate testimony of Professor Warren, "The overarching problem
with this bill is that time and the American economy have passed it
by.... [T] he events of the past eight years have dramatically changed
the economic and social environment in which [the bill must be con-
sidered]."2" The legislative history demonstrates that this balance was
a matter of discussion; in the context of consumer bankruptcy legisla-
195 In the 105th Congress, the House passed H.R. 3150, the "Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1998," and the conference report on that bill. In the 106th Congress, the House passed
H.R. 833, the successor to H.R. 3150, and agreed to the conference report. In the 107th
Congress, the House passed H.R. 333, the "Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act," and a modified version of the conference report on H.R. 333. In the
108th Congress, the House passed H.R. 975, the "Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 2003" and S. 1920, which consisted of the text of H.R. 975, as passed by the
House. H.R. REP. No, 109-31(Part 1), at 6, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88,92-93.
196 The Senate passed legislation in each of the 105th, 106th and 107th sessions of
Congress, as well as a conference report in the 106th Congress. Id. at 6, reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 93.
197 See, e.g., Timothy Spence, Bankruptcy: Senators- Pursue Credit-card Reform, MIAMI HER-
ALD, May 22,2005, at E4 ("Banks and credit card companies, which lobbied for the law, say
it would stop people who live beyond their means and then shirk their debts by declaring
bankruptcy.").
19B See H.R. REP. No. 109-31 (Part 1), at 1-3 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88,
88-90.
igg 147 CoNG. REC. H517-03, (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2001) (statement of Rep. Sensenbren-
ner).
2°°
 Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1381&wit_id=3996  (statement of Elizabeth
Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law School).
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Lion, the House Report dated April 8, 2005 states: "these reforms con-
template replacing the current law's presumption in favor of the
debtor with a mandatory presumption of abuse that would arise under
certain conditions."2°1
Initial political commentary on the Abuse Act has focused mainly
on its creditor-friendly consumer aspects because the legislation
modifies the provisions governing individual bankruptcies more so
than business bankruptcies, and these changes are visible to the
American public.202 Not to be lost in the attention given to the con-
sumer provisions, however, is the effect the Abuse Act will likely have
on Chapter 11 reorganizations and the delicate balance between the
interests of the debtors and creditors.
In some ways, the modifications to the Bankruptcy Code appear
to be a continuation of the creditors' clawback of creditor preroga-
tives and the special-interest legislation that followed the 1978 Act.
Creditors, as repeat players in the Chapter 11 game, have a continu-
ing interest in the system. It is the business of banks, credit card issu-
ers, and utilities, for example, to deal with defaulting debtors inside
and outside of Chapter 11 on a regular basis and, therefore, these
players have a vested interest in the nation's insolvency laws. They are
positioned and incentivized to lobby and obtain passage of special-
interest legislation. They have been largely successful. In contrast, the
interests of debtors are not consistently represented in our pluralist
system. Debtors cannot form an effective lobby because of their tran-
sient interaction with the insolvency system and their more limited
resources and diverse interests. As noted above, the passage of
significant bankruptcy legislation to encourage rehabilitation has
been sporadic historically. Legislation has been spurred by outcry dur-
ing the troughs of the economic boom and bust cycle, with the 1978
Act being the notable exception.
An illustrative example is the Abuse Act's modification of section
365(d) (4) of the Bankruptcy Code, the provision that governs a
debtor's statutory period to assume or reject an unexpired lease of
nonresidential real property. 20 The Abuse Act extends the debtor's
time period to assume or reject the lease from sixty to 120 days, but
201 H.R. REP. No. 109-31 (Part 1), at 13 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 99
(emphasis added).
20 See, e.g., Michael Schroeder, Tough on Debtors, Bankruptcy Bill Advances to Bush, WALL
Sr. J., Apr. 15, 2005, at A2 ("IT] he brunt of the overhaul falls on consumers.").
203 See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 404, 119 Stat. 23, 104-05 (to be codified at, and
amending, 28 U.S.C. § 365).
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deprives the court of the ability to grant extensions of the time period
for cause shown. 204 Previously, courts had routinely extended the time
period, prompting outcries and lobbying from landlords. Now, after
one ninety-day extension, any further extension will require the prior
written consent of the lessor. 206 If such lease is assumed and eventually
rejected, the lessor would be entitled to an administrative expense for
money owed under such lease for a period of two years, without re-
gard to actual damages suffered by the lessor. 206
Similarly, section 366 of the Bankruptcy Code, the provision that
governs the treatment of utility companies, protects utility creditors at
the expense of the debtor. The Abuse Act extends the time within
which a debtor must provide adequate assurance of payment to thirty
days, but enhances utility companies' positions by restricting what
qualifies as adequate assurance. 2D 7 Adequate assurance must be "satis-
factory" to the utility and, while the Abuse Act does not clarify what
"satisfactory" means, it specifically excludes administrative expense
priority.208 Additionally, a utility company will now be able to recover
or setoff against a prepetition deposit without court approval. 209
Other examples of the creditor clawbacks in the Abuse Act include:
(1) the narrowing of the automatic stay with respect to U.S. Tax Court
proceedings,21 ° setoffs relating to contracts for financial instruments
and repurchase agreements, 211 and certain governmental activities
such as exclusion from participation in Medicare; 212 (2) extending the
time period for creditors to seek reclamation of goods; 213 (3) granting
administrative expense status for goods provided twenty days prior to
the commencement of a Chapter 11 case;214 and (4) strengthening
204 See id.
2" Id.
2211 See id.
207 See BAPCPA § 417, 119 Stat, at 100 (to be codified at, and amending, 28 U.S.C.
§ 366).
ma See id.
220 See BAPCPA § 417, 119 Stat. 23, 100 (to be codified at, and amending, 28 U.S.C,
§ 366).
210 See BAPCPA § 709, 119 Stat. at 127 (to be codified at, and amending, 28 U.S.C.
§ 362).
211 See BAPCPA § 907, 119 Stat. at 170-77 (to be codified at, and amending, 28 U.S.C.
§ 362).
212 Sec BAPCPA §1106, 119 Stat. at 192 (to be codified at, and amending, 28 U.S.C.
§ 362).
213 See BAPCPA § 1227, 119 Stat. at 199-200 (to be codified at, and amending, 28
U.S.C. § 546).
214 See BAPCPA § 1227, 119 Stat. at 200 (to be codified at, and amending, 28 U.S.C.
§ 503).
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the ability of creditors to cause a Chapter 11 case to be converted or
dismissed. 215
These examples of special-interest clawbacks in the Abuse Act,
however, do not tell the entire story. In certain ways, the circum-
stances surrounding the passage of the Abuse Act are reminiscent of
the New Deal environment that produced the Chandler Act. Echoing
the New Deal mistrust of Wall Street, the recent flurry of high-profile
fraud scandals that have caused many small investors to lose
significant amounts of money and the length and expense of many
Chapter 11 cases have prompted criticism of the Chapter 11 process.
The resentment by organized groups of debt traders, landlords, les-
sors, and others of the purported entrenchment of management and
professionals, not unlike the pre-Chandler Act criticism of the profes-
sionals' relationship with managers prior to the commencement of
receiverships, has been quite vocal. For example, the Abuse Act adds
new section 503(c) to the Bankruptcy Code, which places consider-
able limits on retention bonuses.m Under the new section 503(c),
retention bonuses can be paid only if: (i) the payment is essential to
retaining the person because that person has a "bona fide job offer
from another business" with equal . or greater compensation and (ii)
the services provided by that person are "essential to the survival of
the business."217 Moreover, the new law caps retention bonuses to an
amount equal to ten times the amount of similar payments given to
non-management employees for any purpose (during the year in
which such payment is made) or, if no similar payments were made,
no greater than 25% of the amount of any similar payments to such
insider for any purpose (during the year in which such payment is
made). 218 Certainly responding to the numerous recent fraud cases,
the Abuse Act modifies section 1104 of the Bankruptcy Code to re-
quire that the U.S. Trustee move for appointment of a Chapter 11
trustee if there are reasonable grounds to suspect current board
members, the CEO, or the CFO of fraud, dishonesty, or criminal con-
215 See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 102, 316, 492, 119 Stat. 23, 27-35, 92, 115-16
(§§ 102, 316, and 442 to be codified at, and amending, 28 U.S.C. §§ 707, 521, and 1112,
respectively).
216 See BAPCPA § 331, 119 Stat. at 102-03 (to be codified at, and amending, 28 U.S.C.
§503).
217 See id.
218 See
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duct in the management of the debtor or the debtor's public financial
reporting. 219
Perhaps the most. significant change to the landscape of Chapter
11 reorganizations is the Abuse Act's effective shortening of the
debtor's exclusive periods to file a plan of reorganization and obtain
acceptances. 22° Under section 1121 of the Bankruptcy Code as
modified by the Abuse Act, extensions of the exclusive periods to file
a plan and obtain acceptances are now limited to eighteen and twenty
months, respectively, from the commencement of the debtor's Chap-
ter 11 case.22I Previously, bankruptcy courts granted, for cause and
under the appropriate circumstances, several extensions that allowed
the debtor to control the bankruptcy process for years. 222
The wisdom of the change to section 1121 of the Bankruptcy Code
is debatable. Although the amendment appears to have been prompted
by the length of recent, high-profile Chapter 11 cases such as Owens
Corning223 and Global Crossing, 224 it is unclear that debtors languish
under the protection of Chapter 11 because of their lack of diligence in
formulating an emergence strategy and filing a plan of reorganization.
Many of these cases can be explained by special circumstances. For ex-
ample, asbestos cases tend to be prolonged because of the unique na-
ture of asbestos claims and the problems associated with estimating
thousands of latent claims, devising a plan, and binding the claimants.
Similarly, Global Crossing's Chapter 11 case lasted almost two years
largely because the debtor's initial plan to sell assets to Hutchison
Whatnpoa and Singapore Telemedia was scrutinized by the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States. 225
212 See BAPCPA § 1405, 119 Stat. at 215 (to be codified at, and amending, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1104).
220 See BAPCPA § 411, 119 Stat. at 106-07 (to be codified at, and amending, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1121).
221 See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 411, 119 Stat. 23, 106-07 (to be codified at, and
amending, 28 U.S.C.§ 1121).
222 E.g., In is UAL Corp., No. 02-48191 (ERW) (Bankr. 	 2002); In is LTV Steel
Co., Inc., No. 00-43866 (WTB) (Banks. N.D. Ohio 2000); In re johns-Manville Corp., No.
82-11656 (BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
225 In re Owens Corning, No. 00-3837 ( .11(F) (Bankr. D. Del. 2000).
2" In is Global Crossing Ltd., No. 02-15749 (REG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002); see, e.g.,
Schroeder, supra note 202, at A2 (citing Owens Corning Corp.'s operating in bankruptcy
since late 2000 as an example of the motivation to speed up business bankruptcies).
225 See Dennis K. Berman, The Economy: Bush Is Expected to Approve Global Crossing Deal,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2003, at A2 ("The anticipated White House endorsement should end
a 20-month saga for Global Crossing, which filed for Chapter 11 bankrupty-court protec-
tion in early 2002, but has struggled to win U.S. government approval for a plan by Singa-
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Notably, based on the year of emergence, the average length of
Chapter 11 reorganizations has actually been declining over the last
twenty years on the whole. 226 Furthermore, it remains to be seen
whether the average length of Chapter 11 cases will decrease because
of the new limits on exclusivity extensions. There is the possibility that
Chapter 11 cases may take longer, be more litigious, and, conse-
quently, be more expensive as creditors now have less of an incentive
to begin working with the debtor immediately. Further, management
may delay commencing a Chapter 11 case even longer, leading to in-
creased recidivism. What is clear, however, is that this change to sec-
tion 1121 of the Bankruptcy Code strengthens the creditors' leverage
by giving them the option of being recalcitrant and waiting out the
debtor's exclusive periods in order to file their own plan. 227
V. DOES CHAPTER 11 REMAIN RELEVANT?
A. Going-Concern Value—A Thing of the Past?
Clearly the concept of comprehensive reorganization as contem-
plated by the 1978 Act is under intense scrutiny. The well-documented
changes to the structure of our economy, including the shift from a
manufacturing-oriented economy to a service-oriented one, the growth
and globalization of financial markets, and the increasing significance
of intangible assets and intellectual capital, to name a few, are
significant and real. The current economy thus stands in contrast to the
post-Industrial Revolution economy dominated by manufacturing and
industry from which the railroad reorganization paradigm emerged,
and it challenges the assumptions behind modern-day reorganization.
Professors Baird and Rasmussen are among those at the forefront
of the argument predicting the demise of Chapter 11. According to
Baird and Rasmussen, structural changes in the U.S. economy over the
past twenty-five years, including the shift from a manufacturing econ-
omy to a service economy, the spiraling costs associated with the corn-
pore Technologies & Telemedia Pte. Ltd., to take majority control over the Florham Park,
NJ., fiber-optic carrier.").
228 See Bankruptcy Yearbook, supra note 2, at 71. From 1982 through 2003, the average
length of a Chapter 11 reorganization was 16.5 months. In 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, the
average length was 14.0, 13.5, 13.8, and 18.2 months, respectively. Id. It should be noted.
however, that this trend may be a result of the increasing prevalence of bankruptcy sales
and the influence of creditors.
2" See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 411, 119 Stat. 23, 106-07 (to be codified at, and
amending, 28 U.S.C. § 1121).
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mencement and prosecution of Chapter 11 cases, as well as other op-
tions available to deal with business failure, make Chapter 11 unneces-
sary and ill-suited for the twenty-first century. 228 Intangible assets now
comprise half of the value of non-financial firms in the United States,
and firms that see Chapter 11, by their nature, do not tend to have in-
tangible assets of significance. 229 Moreover, the hard assets of firms in a
service economy not dominated by industry and manufacturing are
fungible assets2"—general office space, desks, chairs, and word proces-
sors. 231 These assets do not retain greater value staying with a debtor,
but can be used just as well by other firms." 2 Accordingly:
To the extent we understand the law of corporate reorganiza-
tions as providing a collective forum in which creditors and
their common debtor fashion a future for a firm that would
otherwise be torn apart by financial distress, we may safely
conclude that its era has come to an end. 2"
Are the assets of today's businesses less dedicated than the assets
of a railroad? Certainly, the shift to a service economy has meant that
capital-intensive, specialized assets, such as steel furnaces and mills,
represent a smaller component of today's economy. Indeed, the
physical assets of today's economy are office space, desks, and chairs.
The conclusion, however, that firms using Chapter 11 today lack go-
ing-concern value remains unproven and runs contrary to experi-
ence. 234 It is impractical for firms to sell assets as bare as desks or
chairs in bankruptcy. Rather, firms sell whole businesses, entities, or
divisions in bankruptcy. This fact demonstrates that today's market is
rejecting the notion that debtors using Chapter 11 have little or no
going-concern value. The integrity of the business as an ongoing op-
eration, rather than as the separate assets, is what results in the en-
hanced sale prices.235
223 See generally Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 9.
220
 Id. at 766.
250 Fungible assets stand in contrast to dedicated or firm-specific assets. "Railroad as-
sets are the archetypal examples of dedicated assets in American bankruptcy law, as indi-
vidual rails, which together form a track, maintain little value separately, but are far snore
valuable collectively." Miller & Waisman, supra note 22, at 192.
231 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 9, at 766.
232 Id. at 763-66.
235 Id. at 753.
234 Id. at 788; Miller & Waisman, supra note 22, at 191-92.
235 See Miller & Waisman, supra note 22, at 192 n.176 (citing In re Global Crossing Ltd.,
295 B.R. 726 (Bankr. S.D.NN. 2003); In tv Enron Corp„ No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Banks-.
S.D.N.Y. 2001); In is Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 01-056 (PJW) (Bankr. D. Del. 2001)).
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Why do businesses still maintain going-concern value despite the
increasingly fungible nature of corporate assets? The answer lies in
how assets are conceptualized. Baird and Rasmussen are correct in
the sense that fungible assets do not have greater value residing
within a particular business. 236
 This is only true, however, when the as-
sets have not yet been deployed. Businesses incur costs in acquiring, install-
ing, and otherwise deploying assets for use. Similarly, starting a busi)
ness from scratch is expensive and time-consuming and entails a large
degree of entrepreneurial risk. Accordingly, office space, chairs,
desks, and word processors, although fungible in the absolute sense,
are dedicated in a truer sense. 237
Stated differently, firms do differentiate between transactions in-
side the firm and outside the firm. Although, as Baird and Rasmussen
note, the ability to conduct business through contracts outside the firm
is increasingly common today, 258 the flurry of recent mergers and ac-
quisitions activity and the move toward consolidation across many in-
dustries suggest that there are benefits that cannot be obtained by sim-
ply contracting with the marketplace. For example, businesses maintain
going-concern value as a result of centralized management, overlap-
ping systems, and other benefits of economies of scale. As Baird and
Rasmussen admit, transaction costs keep certain activities within the
organization: "There is no special magic beyond transaction costs in
accounting for any particular collection of assets assembled within a
single firm. "239
In addition, firms have going-concern value even in the absence of
transaction costs. Going-concern value is primarily realized through a
firm's intangible ability to use its assets more efficiently than its com-
petitors. The conclusion of Baird and Rasmussen that all firms using
Chapter 11, by their unsuccessful nature, lack such ability 240 is overly
simplistic. Today's firms are often multinational and diversified. A firm
may file for Chapter 11 despite having highly profitable lines of husi-
"6 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 9, at 773-75.
"7 Professor LoPucki has a similar response to Baird and Rasmussen. He argues that
substantial value exists in the relationships of a firm's completely fungible assets. See Lynn
M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen's The End of
Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 645, 653 (2003). Both arguments recognize that, in spite of
the increased efficiency and competitiveness of the various markets of our economy, trans-
action costs still exist.
25I3 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 9, at 770.
239 Id. at 754.
240 Id. at 763-64.
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ness or divisions. 241 A company may be competitive in its industry, yet
require Chapter 11 protection for reasons not directly related to the
company's competitive position. 242
B. Why Chapter 11 Remains Relevant
As defaulting businesses continue to have going-concern value,
Chapter 11 remains relevant to preserving that. value, whether through
a traditional reorganization or a bankruptcy sale. Chapter 11 has en-
during value as a transparent and neutral multiparty forum. It brings
all parties in interest to the table to make decisions regarding whether
to pursue a reorganization or sale and how to marshal and allocate the
proceeds thereafter. As we have stated before, "[t] he automatic stay
prevents the 'race to the courthouse' or dismemberment of a debtor's
assets prior to adequate consideration of the interests of all parties to
the proceeding and a determination as to the appropriate course of
action. "24s
Chapter 11 provides a multiparty forum for a debtor to rehabili-
tate in an orderly fashion under the supervision of the court, to the
extent that rehabilitation remains the primary policy goal of the
Bankruptcy Code. Anti-Chapter 11 theorists such as Baird and Ras-
mussen, for example, presuppose that maximization of credit recov-
ery comes ahead of rehabilitation when arguing that Chapter 11 is
unnecessary so long as there is a marketplace for the debtor's as-
se ts. 244 Inferring from the prevalence of section 363 sales and the
241 see. e.g., In in Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 01-056 (PJW) (certain flight routes of
TWA were still highly profitable despite overall losses); In re Em-on Corp., No. 01-16034
(AJG) (Enron's trading operations were highly lucrative).
242
 Texaco, for example, commenced Chapter 11 cases in the face of a $10.53 billion
judgment to Pennzoil. "When Texaco filed for bankruptcy, no one thought for a moment
that the giant oil company would be shut down and its assets scattered to the winds."
SKEEL, supra note 18, at 1; see, e.g., In re Lionel L.L.C., No. 04-17324 (BRL) (Bantu-.
S.D.N.Y. 2904) (bankruptcy action commenced because of adverse multi-million dollar
judgment in trade secrets dispute); In in Loral Space & Commc'ns, Inc., No. 03-41710
(RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (bankruptcy action commenced in part to utilize section
363 of the Bankruptcy Code and because of losses stemming from a poor investment); In
in WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-13533 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (bankruptcy action com-
menced because of fraud allegations); In re Enron corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (same); In re
Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. 01-15288 (BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) (bankruptcy action
commenced because of pension liability); In in Owens Corning, No. 00-3837 (JKF)
(Bankr. D. Del. 2000) (bankruptcy action commenced because of asbestos claims).
24! Miller & Waisman, supra note 22, at 196.
244 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 9, at 777 ("Even if control rights are not allo-
cated coherently, there is still no need for a collective forum that decides the fate of the
firm if the firm can be sold in the marketplace as a going concern."). It should be noted
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creditor-in-possession phenomenon of the current Chapter 11 envi-
ronment that creditor recovery maximization is the primary aim of
the Bankruptcy Code is putting the cart before the horse. Immedi-
ately after passage of the 1978 Act, it was unequivocal that the Bank-
ruptcy Code's primary policy objective was debtor rehabilitation with
attendant preservation of jobs. Although some of the changes that
have occurred as to the objectives of Chapter 11 since 1978 are attrib-
utable to the special-interest legislation including the Abuse Act, a
large degree of the creditor-in-possession phenomenon is the result of
creditors' ability to seize control of the process. Rehabilitation re-
mains a predominant, if not the predominant, objective of the Bank-
ruptcy Code itself. In this sense, disproportionate creditor control
and influence is an argument for the strengthening of Chapter 11, not
for its dismantling.
Chapter 11 has significant value as a neutral forum. To preserve
faith in our economic system and rule of law, any insolvency system
must be fair and able to respond to changing economic times and
tensions to achieve the objectives of the legislation. Chapter 11 is a
process designed to resolve, in a rational, practical manner, conflicts
between the debtor, creditors, and other economic stakeholders, as
well as conflicts between competing and other creditors who often
have diametrically opposed interests. Currently, the Chapter 11 proc-
ess often is skewed in favor of the controlling creditor(s) at the ex-
pense of other parties in interest.
Excessive creditor control remains undesirable because such
influence may cause the debtor's operations to be managed solely in
the interests of the particular controlling creditor group, thereby
foreclosing the debtor's restructuring options. For example, the pro-
visions of a DIP agreement can constrain the debtor's flexibility and
take away altogether the option of a possible successful reorganiza-
tion, leaving a sale as the only viable alternative. One court, recogniz-
ing this danger, commented on a financing arrangement:
that Chapter 11 remains useful when there is no marketplace for assets and thus a tradi-
tional reorganization is the only option. Many Chapter 11 cases involve businesses that do
not receive significant interest from prospective buyers for their assets. See, e.g., In is UAL
Corp., No. 02-48191 (ERW) (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002) (depressed airline industry); In is Beth-
lehem Steel Corp., No. 01-15288 (BILL) (companies in heavily depressed industries generally
do not receive significant buyer interest); In is Owens Corning No. 00-3837 (JKF) (gener-
ally, the successor liability issues of asbestos companies discourage potential interest of
prospective buyers); In is Chateaugay Corp., No. 86-11270 (BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(environmental liability issues also potentially discourage prospective buyers).
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Under the guise of financing a reorganization, the Bank
would disarm the Debtor of all weapons usable against it for
the bankruptcy estate's benefit, place the Debtor in bondage
working for the Bank, seize control of the reins of reorganiza-
tion, and steal a, march on other creditors in numerous ways.
The Financing Agreement would pervert the reorganizational
process from one designed to accommodate all classes of
creditors and equity interests to one specially crafted for the
benefit of the Bank and the Debtor's principals who guaran-
teed its debt. 245
Chapter 11 is not only a forum for creditors and equity-interest
holders to be represented; it also provides a forum for all stakeholders
to be heard. As discussed above, the need for a bankruptcy law during
the railroad failures of the late nineteenth century drew special atten-
tion in light of the importance of railroads to the rapidly industrializ-
ing economy. Courts overseeing the railroad equity receiverships en-
deavored to craft a solution that would preserve the functioning of
the nation's railroads in light of their importance to parties beyond
the railroad's creditors and shareholders. Similarly, the legislative his-
tory of the 1978 Act is liberally sprinkled with discussions of the im-
portance of such economic externalities as employees and the public
in terest.248
Chapter 11 provides the debtor and courts the opportunity to
weigh public policy considerations and to consider economic external-
ities. If parties are allowed to secure their own financial security without
regard to external costs or benefits of potential transactions, important
issues will be neglected in the bankruptcy process (for example, maxi-
mization of return to all creditors, continued workforce employment,
environmental concerns, equity, and the public interest). The risk that
employees would be displaced, firms would be dissolved, and the mar-
ket would be flooded with workers may increase exponentially. In:
creased unemployment and contraction of income may have dramatic
and far-reaching effects upon a local economy in which the debtor op-
erated.
245 In re Tenney Vill. Co. Inc., 104 B.R. 562,568 (Banks. D.N.H. 1989).
246 See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 53-62 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6014-23
(letter from Judge Conrad Cyr responding to congressional request for information about
cases with special community impact); H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 72 (1973); 124 CONG.
REC. 33990 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). See generally Warren, supra note 87, at
788 & n.24 (citing 124 CONG. REC. 32392 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards)).
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Bankruptcy will raise concerns regarding important national is-
sues such as antitrust, 247 national security, 248 public health, 249 and
transportation. 25° Opponents of Chapter 11 have failed to address
how such public policy concerns can otherwise be adequately ad-
dressed. This problem is heightened where public policy claimants
have limited interests and little incentive to participate. Accordingly,
Chapter 11 provides a forum to foster debate over public policy, the
benefits of which might not otherwise be considered.
C. Why Chapter 11 Remains Relevant to a Sale
Critics of Chapter 11 argue that a reorganization process is un-
necessary as long as there is a marketplace to sell assets. 251 If a buyer is
willing to pay a market price for assets, there is no need for a costly
rehabilitative process. In turn, creditors benefit because they poten-
tially obtain a greater recovery, one of the fundamental aims of reor-
ganization.
Is the increasing prevalence of section 363 sales desirable? Sales,
whether to strategic or financial buyers, arguably are beneficial be-
cause they can allow the assets to fetch a fair price, as determined by
the market, and transfer the assets to a party better suited to deploy
such assets. This argument emphasizes the rights of creditors and the
maximization of recoveries and places great reliance on the efficiency
of the markets to allocate resources. It is appealing because it posits
that the optimal economic decision will be made by an invisible hand
when each party simply acts only out of its own self interest.
247 Many Chapter 11 cases involving sales require antitrust clearance such as Hart-
Scott-Rodino approval. See, e.g.. In re Allegiance Telecom, Inc., No. 03-13057 (RDD)
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003). Furthermore, a Chapter 11 case, by its nature, can improve an
overcrowded industry's health by decreasing capacity, or it can decrease competitiveness in
a healthy industry by removing a player from the market.
249
 See, e.g., In re Global Crossing, Ltd., No. 02-40188 (REG); In re WoridCom, Inc.. No. 02-
13533 (AJG).
249 See, e.g., In re United Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 97-1159, 1997 WL 176574, at *5
(D.Nj. Mar. 26, 1997) (stating that, in evaluating a sale of assets, a district court must look
to the overriding consideration of public health); In te Brethren Care of South Bend, Inc.,
98 B.R. 927, 934 (Bankr. N.D. Intl. 1989) (stating that, in evaluating the sale of a not-for-
profit nursing care facility's assets, the well-being of the residents of the facility is of par-
ticular concern).
250 See, e.g., In re US Airways Group, No. 04-13820 (SSM) (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004); In re
US Airways Group, No. 02-83984 (SSM) (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002); In re UAL Corp., No. 02 B
48191 (ERW) (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002). Like the railroads of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, air travel has had a profound effect on American society and is a critical part of
the economy's infrastructure.
251 See, e.g., Baird Be Rasmussen, supra note 9, at 777.
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Conversely, critics of the increased occurrences of section 363
sales might question the efficiency of our markets and its ability to
allocate resources optimally. They may further argue that the preva-
lence of sales ignores the rehabilitative intent of the 1978 Act, the
transaction costs associated with displacing businesses, and the exter-
nalities of bankruptcy. As noted above, rehabilitation is an important
policy objective of the Bankruptcy Code, and Congress indicated that
consideration was to be given to the impact that a bankruptcy would
have, for example, on the community of the debtor.
Undoubtedly, there are compelling arguments in favor of sales in
contrast to traditional reorganizations. What is unique and significant
about Chapter 11 is that it allows the question to be considered in a
meaningful manner. Absent a neutral, multiparty forum, secured
lenders will likely exert their influence over a debtor and advocate a
sale, as their preference is inherently toward the certainty of recovery
that a sale can provide. The benefit of Chapter 11 is the ability to con-
sider both options with input from the debtor, all creditors, and other
stakeholders such as employees and the public.
Even if one accepts as a given the benefit of sales and the precept
of maximizing creditor recoveries, Chapter 11 remains important.
One of the important functions of Chapter 11 is creating and allocating
value among creditors. To this end, there are many instances when
the use of the Chapter 11 process to marshal claims properly and to
sell assets free and clear of all claims raises the purchase price, a result
that cannot easily be achieved outside the Chapter 11 process. This is
perhaps one reason that, though troubled companies are not re-
quired to use Chapter 11 as a conduit for a sale of their businesses, it
is well understood that Chapter 11 provides a market for such a sale
and creates a forum for addressing the future of the business and the
liquidation of its assets to pay creditors. The creation of such a market
is arguably desirable because it allows the assets to fetch a fair price, as
determined by the market, and transfers the assets to a party better
suited to put such assets to their best use.
Chapter 11 also helps to ensure that value is allocated equitably
between creditors of different levels of seniority. For example, in ef-
fecting a sale, senior secured creditors may exercise their influence
over the debtor's management to sell assets under distortedly conser-
vative valuations, to the detriment of junior creditors.252 Conversely,
although less common, a controlling junior creditor may influence
"2 Miller et al., supra note 157, at 21.
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management to overestimate the value of the debtor to increase its
likelihood of recovery, which can increase the risk of non-recovery for
senior creditors. The wide differences in valuations of assets and the
imprecise nature of valuation make this outcome possible.
A study by Stuart Gilson, Edith Hotchkiss, and Richard Ruback
suggests that such distortion of valuations may be a common result of
creditor control. 255 The nature of creditors' claims as prioritized makes
this a natural outcome:
(A] free-rider problem arises from the obvious fact that the
secured party managing collateral sales has no incentive to re-
alize more than the amount of its debt. Anything above that
amount must be distributed to other secured parties, the
bankruptcy trustee, or the debtor—none of whom bear the
costs and risks of the sales. 251
Creditor-influenced undervaluation of assets has been recog-
nized by the bankruptcy courts. In In re Exide Technologies, Judge Carey
• held that the debtor's plan significantly undervalued the debtor. 255
The financial advisor to the debtor submitted a valuation of between
$950 million and $1.05 billion, while the financial advisor to the
creditors' committee submitted a valuation of between $1.478 billion
and $1.711 billion. 256 Both sides used the same three methodolo-
gies—comparable company analysis, comparable transaction analysis,
and discounted cash flow. 257 Judge Carey ultimately determined the
debtor's valuation to be in the range of $1.4 billion to $1.6 billion?"
Among other arguments that informed this holding was the argument
that controlling senior creditors had influenced the debtor's valua-
tion so as to enhance senior creditor recoveries to the detriment of
unsecured creditors. 259
253 Stuart C. Gilson, et al., Valuation of Bankrupt Firms, 13 REV. or FN. Sruu. 43, 45-46
(2000).
254 See Westbrook, supra note 188, at 845.
255 303 B.R. 48, 66 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
256 Id. at 59.
257 Id.
2513 Id. at 66.
259 Id. at 58-66. When Exide emerged from bankruptcy in May 2004, the market sup-
ported the debtor's proposal, setting an enterprise value and a market capitalization of
$1.03 billion and $544 million, respectively. By November 16, 2005, Exide's enterprise
value and market capitalization had declined to $788 million and $109 million, respec-
tively. Judge Carey ignored the Supreme Court's admonition that the best way to deter-
mine value is by market forces. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle
St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 456-57 (1999) (citation omitted). The debtor's proposed valua-
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D. Contractualism
The last decade has seen significant debate over privatization of
the recovery process or "contractualism."26° Baird and Rasmussen ar-
gue:
If these [control] rights are allocated sensibly, the shutdown
decision will reside in the hands of those with the best in-
formation and the appropriate incentives to exercise it cor-
rectly. If the transaction costs associated with such contract-
ing are low enough, we once again have no need for a law of
corporate reorganizations as traditionally understood. 261
Although appealing as a solution to the criticism of Chapter 11 proc-
ess as costly and lengthy, contractualism is not a meaningful alterna-
tive to a multiparty, court-supervised forum. It is both undesirable and
unworkable.
Contractualisrn is undesirable because it transforms the problem
of the default of a business, a situation affecting a myriad of parties,
known and unknown, into a process typically dominated by one
party. 262 The contractual model fails to take into account the fact that
each party possesses only its own information and its own subjective
belief as to what is the "correct" decision. It is precisely these narrow,
self-motivated positions that Chapter 11 is designed to test and chal-
lenge through an adversarial process. In the real world, decisions are
made by the parties that possess control; such parties are not neces-
sarily in a position (or incentivized) to make optimal decisions on be-
half of all stakeholders.
Of course, this criticism relates to the more general political and
economic debate over the appropriate level of oversight and govern-
mental intervention in our markets, a debate which is beyond the
scope of this Article. Perhaps, as a matter of priorities, maximization
don took into account market forces—namely, "the price that could be realized for a
debtor's assets in a realistic framework, assuming a willing seller and a willing buyer." In re
Exide Techs., 303 B.R. at 59. The debtor's expert conducted a "private equity process" where
offers were solicited from numerous potential purchasers, including private equity firms
and one strategic buyer. Id. By contrast, the creditor committee's proposal was a straight-
forward, formulaic application of valuation methodology without reference to such market
forces. See id. at 60.
26° See Westbrook, supra note 188, at 827-30.
261 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 9, at 778.
262 For a detailed discussion of why contractualism is not possible without a dominant
secured interest encumbering substantially all of the debtor's assets, see generally West-
brook, supra note 188.
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of creditor recoveries as an objective of Chapter 11 is more important
than rehabilitation of the debtor. Perhaps liquidation is more appro-
priate in industries suffering from overcapacity. The precise point is
that these issues must be considered. Often the discussion of Chapter
11 focuses on rights, particularly the rights of secured creditors, while
ignoring the central question of what is trying to be achieved—reha-
bilitation versus liquidation. In many of these cases, reorganization is
quite possible (and may produce a greater recovery to all creditors),
but the controlling interests of senior creditors push the debtor to-
ward an immediate sale. The Chapter 11 model is desirable because it
allows the issue to be considered on a case-by-case basis instead of ab-
dicating these important policy considerations to the free market re-
gime under the assumption that private rights and maximization of
recoveries will produce socially optimal outcomes.
Contractualisin also fails as an alternative to the Chapter 11 pro-
cess because it is unworkable. Not only do proponents of this model
fail to cite a relevant case where parties efficiently allocated rights
among interest holders, they also fail to explain in detail exactly how a
debtor can privately contract away the operational decisions of a busi-
ness between such parties as secured lenders, unsecured creditors,
trade creditors, tort claimants, and equity-interest holders. Baird and
Rasmussen cite high-tech "startup" corporations, like Webvan, as
working models of contractualism. 263 Startups, however, are not useful
in demonstrating whether a single collective forum can be displaced
by a regime of private contract. By their own admission, startups pos-
sess little, if any, debt, so there is no conflict between senior and jun-
ior claimants. They are typically controlled by a group of sophisticated
equity investors (usually a venture capital fund with experience incu-
bating similar startups) better equipped to make efficient decisions
than is the typical shareholder. Unlike the railroads of the nineteenth
century, startups do not have fragmented debt interests and equity
ownership, but instead tend to have simple capital structures, includ-
ing only one, if any, class of debt. Railroads, however, carried substan-
tial secured debt, unsecured debt, and equity—all of which were
fragmented among numerous parties in interest?"
The associated increase in parties in interest in troubled firms
and the number of parties that need to be noticed in any particular
case make contracting control rights among disputing parties exceed-
263 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 9, at 781.
281 See SKEE1„ supra note 18, at 58.
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ingly difficult. The ability of any one significant party to hold up the
process or generate litigation materially increases the potential that
such party can hcild up the process or create chaos by attempting to
collect before others. Although Baird and Rasmussen argue that con-
trol rights can be easily and efficiently allocated, the multiplicity of
parties in interest makes it difficult. 2°5 As a consequence, the "shut-
down" decision, as they characterize it, is only a small part of the
efficient allocation of control rights. Deciding who should acquire the
control rights and be empowered to make the "shutdown" decision in
the absence of a dominant secured creditor is very challenging.
E. Successful Reorganizations
Amid the increasing number of Chapter 11 cases that result sim-
ply in salesm and the often-discussed rates of recidivism of debtors,2°7
examples of successful, traditional reorganizations still remain.
Federated Department Stores268 is an example of a highly success-
ful, old-fashioned restructuring. Before its Chapter 11 case, Federated
was saddled with $7.5 billion of debt after being purchased in a highly
leveraged takeover by Canada's Campeau Corporation in 1988.2°9 Its
business was declining, and suppliers had lost confidence. 27° Further-
more, while in Chapter 11, Federated was forced to hold a fire sale of
265 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 9, at 781.
263 Sec, e.g., In re AT&T Latin Am. Corp, No. 03-13538 (RAM) (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2003);
In re Top-Flite, Inc., No. 03-12003 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. 2003); In re Budget Group, No.
02-12152 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. 2002); In reVelocita Corp., No. 02-35895 (DHS) (Bankr.
D.N.J. 2002); In re Loews Cineplex Entm't Corp., No. 01-40346 (ALG) {Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2001); In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., No, 01-15288 (BRL); In re ANC Rental Corp., No. 01-
11200 (MFW) (Bankr. D. Del. 2001); In re Polaroid Corp., No. 01-10864 (JPW) (Bankr. D.
Del. 2001); In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 01-00056 (PJW).
"7 See, e.g., Edward I. Altman, Evaluating the Chapter 11 Bankruptc -Reorganization Process,
1993 CoLum. Bus. L. REV. 1,6. When considering the rates of recidivism of debtors, it is
important to recognize the role and responsibility of the court. Once a plan is presented,
the bankruptcy court is without means to assess independently its feasibility and to over-
come the impact of the debtors and creditors who have combined to urge confirmation.
Moreover, it is debatable whether, even given such means, courts should impart their own
views in an adversarial process when the parties in interest have reached agreement. For a
more detailed discussion of the role courts play in recidivism, compare Lynn M. LoPucki &
Sara D. Kahn, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical
Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom," 54 VAND. L. REV. 231 (2001), with Harvey R. Miller, Chapter
11 Reorganization. Cases and the Delaware Myth, 55 VAND, L. REV, 1987 (2002).
"a In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., No. 90-10130 (BP) (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990)
(emerging in 1992).
269 Lisa DiCarlo, Federated's Fashionable Bottom Line, FORBES.COM , Jan. 24,2002, http://
www.forbes.com/2002/01/24/0124federated.html.
270 See id.
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some of its key assets, including buildings. 271 Despite these problems,
Federated was able to use Chapter 11 to restructure.272 Federated
reached a deal to swap $5 billion in debt and other liabilities for new
notes and equity, allowing it to emerge triumphantly from bankruptcy
protection.275 In Federated's first fiscal quarter after emergence, the
company recorded an $11.8 million profit. 274 In 1994, Federated ac-
quired its archrival, Macy's, pursuant to Macy's Chapter 11 plan of re-
organization.275 By 1998, Federated's debt was rated as 'investment"
grade by the major rating agencies. 276
Similarly, Zales International Corporation,277 the famous jewelry
retailer, is another example of a traditional restructuring. While in
Chapter 11, Zales evaluated and refocused its business strategy, ex-
panding merchandise selection and improving merchandise quality. 278
Since emergence, Zales has improved sales, expanded store openings,
and put itself in a position to compete for market leadership in its in-
dustry. 279 WorldCom, Inc. 28° is yet another example. After having shed
$36 billion in debt and retaining an enviable business customer list,
WorldCom emerged from Chapter 11 protection, renamed as MCI,
with $6 billion in cash, to the chagrin of competitors fearful of a price
war.281 Notably, earlier this year, MCI was the target of a fierce take-
over battle between Verizon and Qwest. 282
These examples are not intended to be empirical illustrations
that traditional reorganizations remain a significant part of Chapter
11. Instead, they are meant to demonstrate that, if Chapter 11 is used
proactively and with rehabilitation in mind, it can be an effective tool
for turning around failing businesses. Of course, not all businesses
can be turned around because many that resort to Chapter 11 are be-
271 Id.
272 See id,
27g Id,
274 DiCarlo, supra note 269.
273 Id.
278 Id.
277 In re Zales Int'l Corp., No. 92-30707 (SAF) (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (emerging in
1993).
278 See Elaine be Simone, Zales jewelers Make Dazzling Recovery, RETAIL TRAFFIC, Nov. 1,
1998, http://retailtrafficmag.com/mag/retail_zalesjewelers_makes/index.htnal.
279 See id.; see also Robert Hurtado, The Rise in the Stock of Zales, the National Jewelry Chain,
Has Shown There is Life After Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1996, at D12.
280 In re WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-13533 (AJG) (emerging in 2004).
28' See MCI Emerges from Bankruptcy, CNN/MONEY, Apr. 20, 2004, http://money.
cnn.com/2004/04/20/technology/mci_bankruptcy/.
282 See, e.g., Dionne Searcey, Protest by MCI Shareholders May Push Qwest to Rejoin Battle,
WALL ST. J., May 16, 2005, at B4,
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yond redemption. There is no solution for the lack of a viable busi-
ness model. Similarly, businesses cannot be turned around to the ex-
tent they delay too long in seeking Chapter 11 relief or to the extent
their operations are effectively constrained by creditors. The danger
here is the potential that arguments of the demise of Chapter 11
based on the lack of reorganizations in the traditional sense or the
high degree of recidivism will become self-fulfilling prophecies.
To encourage reorganization, it is imperative that Chapter 11 be
restored as a more neutral forum that gives the debtor and all parties
in interest a meaningful ability to reorganize. This imperative seems
greater than ever given the increasing power and influence of credi-
tors. Unfortunately, at this time, much of the criticism of the Chapter
11 process appears aimed squarely at the debtor. In that respect, there
is a perception that the current length and cost of Chapter 11 cases is
the fault of the intransigent debtor. The present course of action of
further handicapping the debtor may lead only to more recidivism
and fire sales, an unwelcome result. It is not even clear that, under
this current creditor-in-possession regime, all creditors, as opposed to
senior secured creditors only, do better. The Chapter 11 process re-
quires a reassessment of which parties are currently at the helm, and
which parties should be:
The reason that control of the process of recovery has be-
come so important is that [going concern sales or financial
restructurings] often require more time and more complex
management, both operational and financial, than a simple
piecemeal liquidation. At the same time, the range of possi-
ble values, from a low value in a simple liquidation to a high
value obtained from a creative merger, has become much
greater as well. Closely related is the fact that key decisions
in this more complex environment turn importantly upon
evaluation of risk and a willingness to accept risk. 283
Interestingly, the evolution of the reorganization model in the
United States is moving opposite to the European model, which is tak-
ing a form similar to the Chapter 11 model that prevailed from 1979
through the end of the twentieth century. 284 The United Kingdom's
recently enacted insolvency law is a particularly useful example for
283 Westbrook, supra note 188, at 804-05.
284 See SKEEL, supra note 18, at 238-43.
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purposes of contrast. 286 It abolished a long-standing system of secured
con tractualism. 286
 The overhaul was designed to reduce the impact of
one party over the process. According to Professor jay Westbrook:
[Neutrality is a necessary concept in any system for manag-
ing a general default in which the policymaker provides for
multiple beneficiaries and charges the manager with maxi-
mizing value for all of them. A dominant secured party can-
not be a neutral manager, and its management creates a se-
rious potential of loss for other beneficiaries. 287
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy law in the United States has evolved significantly over
the last century. The twenty-five years following the enactment of the
1978 Act, the changes that the reorganization world currently is under-
going, and the enactment of the Abuse Act raise the question as to
whether it has come full circle. Many of today's changes go to the core
of the whole concept and objective of Chapter 11 and are reminiscent
of the atmosphere behind the Chandler Act. Chapter X of the Chan-
dler Act, although comprehensive and well-intentioned, failed to en-
courage reorganization because it was structurally inefficient and per-
haps overly complex, thereby requiring the expenditure of excessive
time and money. At a time when the concept of reorganization remains
relevant, there is a danger of repeating the mistake of discouraging dis-
tressed companies from pursuing rehabilitation as originally contem-
plated by the 1978 Act, a policy goal that seems to have diminished. De-
spite the contractions of the debtor protections that were provided for
in the 1978 Act, there is still a need to provide distressed debtors a rea-
sonable opportunity to rehabilitate themselves for the benefit of all
stakeholders and interests and not just a group of sophisticated, aggres-
sive lenders and speculative investors. The economy remains credit-
intensive, and there must be relief from oppressive debt that can be
provided only by a fair and reasonable reorganization law.
Many of the arguments underlying the assertion of Chapter 11's
demise actually demonstrate the opposite—that there is a need for a
reinvigorated, rehabilitation-oriented process. The criticisms of Chap-
ter 11 often focus on the fact that the benefits of Chapter 11 do not
228 See id.; Westbrook, supra note 188, at 852-55.
288 See SKEEL, Supra note 18, at 238-43; Westbrook, supra note 188, at 852-55.
427 Westbrook, supra note 188, at 852 (citation omitted).
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justify its costs, particularly those of professionals' fees. 288 This con-
cern is not a novel one289 and appears to stem from the high propor-
tion of professionals' fees in recent fraud cases. 29° Given this concern,
perhaps the more relevant question going forward is whether Chapter
11 should be based on an adversarial process. The American legal and
political system is rooted in the adversarial process and the notion of
competing parties or factions, but such systems, by their nature, gen-
erate considerable litigation and expense. Do the costs of the Chapter
11 process outweigh its benefits? Does the adversarial process remain
relevant? These questions must be asked and answered as long as
there is a continuing need for reorganization and rehabilitation.
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